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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

TRAVIS BERTOCH,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20030111-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, defendant entered a
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 8-3 7-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), reserving the right
to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Is defendant precluded from attacking the validity of the weapons pat-down on
appeal, where he conceded below that the pat-down was justified and argued only that its
scope was exceeded when the trooper allegedly seized non-weapon contraband?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Below, defendant did not question the justification for the weapons pat-down,
consequently, he is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See State
v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ffif 8-11, 86 P.3d 759 (reaffirming mandate that specific
objections must be raised in the trial court or be waived on appeal); State v. Rochell, 850
P.2d 480, 484 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (strictly applying preservation requirement to appeal
arising from conditional guilty plea).
2. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to suppress his pre-Miranda
statements on the ground that the statements were volunteered and/or made during a noncustodial investigative detention?
This Court reviews "'the factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to suppress evidence . . . under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard,
and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts.'" See State v. Zesiger, 2003
UT App 37,1f 7, 65 P.3d 314 (quoting State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah
1994)), cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (Utah 2003).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution generally control
the issues raised on appeal, but their wording is not determinative.
amendments and any cited statutes or rules are attached in Addendum A.

2
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Copies of the

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 18, 2001, defendant was charged with third degree felony possession
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), class B misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana), class B misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia
(marijuana pipe and rolling papers), and improper positioning of a license plate, a class C
misdemeanor (R. 1-5). Following a preliminary hearing on March 14,2002, defendant was
bound over for trial (R. 31-32; R294: 28-29).
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia
and statements made at the scene (R. 47-136, 172-80). See Addendum C (Defendant's
Motion andMemoranda). The State opposed the motion (R. 139-52). Defendant submitted
the matter without an evidentiary hearing or oral argument based on the parties' memoranda,
a transcript of the preliminary hearing, and the police reports (R. 77-136; R295: 2-5). On
September 30, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suppress (R. 224; R287: 3-6). See
Addendum B (Ruling). No written findings were entered (R. 285).l
On October 4,2002, defendant entered a guilty plea to third degree felony possession
and the remaining charges were dismissed (R296: 2-10). The Statement of Defendant in
Advance of Plea did not condition the guilty plea on a reservation of the right to appeal (R.
229-36). During the plea hearing, however, the trial court sua sponte asked defendant if he
was "reserving the right to appeal my ruling on your motion to suppress or not" (R296: 5).
1

Interestingly, the judge included in the record his handwritten notes outlining his
oral ruling (R. 295). The notes are nearly identical to the oral ruling and both fully reflect
the court's reasoning.
3
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Defense counsel responded, "Yes, your honor, I would like to do that" (id.). The prosecutor
did not respond (id.).2
On December 16, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory term of
imprisonment of zero-to-five years, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation
on condition that he serve a year in jail, pay a fine, and complete an in-patient substance
abuse program (R. 242-44; R288: 2-8). Confusion arose over defendant's notice of appeal
and the court extended the time for filing (R. 246-56). On February 6, 2003, defendant
timely appealed (R. 257-58).
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
On September 19,2001, around 9:00 p.m., Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Christopher
Witte observed a vehicle on SR 201 near Redwood Road (R294: 5-6).4 The vehicle had no
rear trunk lid and no license plate was attached (R294: 6). The trooper thought a license
plate was lying flat on the ledge near the rear window, but could not see its numbers (R296:

2

A conditional plea requires the consent of the prosecutor, which consent should
be affirmatively reflected in the record. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 1 l(i) (Add. A). See also
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that the record must
indicate the conditional nature of a plea without any ambiguity). Despite the prosecutor's
silence in this case, it is clear he was aware of the conditional nature of the plea and did
not oppose it (R296: 2-10).
3

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress. See State v. Chansamore, 2003 UT App 107, \ 1 n.l, 69
P.3d293.
4

The State agrees with defendant that the preliminary hearing transcript
mistakenly refers to Trooper Witte as Trooper Woody.
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6, 13).5 The trooper knew that when a vehicle is stolen, its license plate is often removed
(R294: 15). Additionally, Utah law requires a license plate to be properly displayed (R287:
4). See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-403(3) (1998) (Add A). The trooper followed the vehicle
for a few minutes until it reached a safe location on 1-15 and pulled it over (R294: 13-14).
Defendant was alone in the vehicle (R294: 7). When the trooper approached the
driver's window, he immediately "smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating
from" defendant (R294:7; R287:3). Defendant's eyes were blood-shot and, as they initially
conversed, the trooper noted that defendant's speech was slowed (R. 79-80). The trooper,
whose duties and training included DUI enforcement and drug recognition, believed
defendant was possibly impaired and asked him if he had been drinking; defendant responded
that he had had two beers (R. 79; R294: 8-10, 14). The trooper asked defendant for his
driver's license and registration, which defendant produced, but the trooper decided to
conduct field sobriety tests before "running" the documents (R294: 8, 14).
The trooper asked defendant to step out of the vehicle and "patted him down for my
safety just to check for weapons" by patting the outside of defendant's clothing at the
waistline and pockets (R294: 7-8,15,17). The trooper felt a hard object in defendant's left
pants pocket which he suspected was a small marijuana pipe (R294: 9,1). The trooper said,
"This is a pipe" (R294: 19). Defendant volunteered that it was a marijuana pipe and said he
had a baggie of marijuana in his other pocket (R294: 9,17-18; R287: 3-4). Later, defendant

5

It is unclear if the trooper saw the plate before or after he approached the stopped
vehicle, but in either case, he could not read the plate's numbers (R294: 6, 13).
5
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volunteered that he had smoked marijuana the previous evening (R. 79; R287: 3). The
trooper did not remove the pipe or marijuana and instructed defendant to leave the items in
his pockets while he performed the field sobriety tests (R294: 9).
Defendant failed the field sobriety tests "miserably" and was arrested for DUI (R294:
8, 24-25; R. 80, 99).6 Incident to the arrest, the trooper handcuffed defendant and removed
the pipe and marijuana from his pockets (R294: 9, 24; R287: 4). The pipe contained burnt
marijuana residue (R294: 9). Defendant's vehicle was impounded and searched; zig-zag
rolling papers, typically used to smoke marijuana, were found inside (R294: 12). A blood
draw was taken with defendant's consent (R294:10). Defendant was advised of his Miranda

6

Defendant exhibited multiple indicators of impairment. His breath smelled of
alcohol, his speech was slow, his eyes were red and blood shot, the back of his tongue had
a greenish tint and blisters, his eyes lacked smooth pursuit, both eyes exhibited distinct
nystagmus at maximum deviation, he swayed, he had to raise his arms for balance, and he
stepped off the line to maintain his balance (R. 79-80, 99; R294: 8, 24-25). The trooper
agreed that defendant was not the "drunkest person" he had seen, but believed he was
sufficiently impaired that he could not safely drive (R294: 8, 25). A subsequent
preliminary screen of defendant's blood showed an alcohol level of .01 or no alcohol
impairment and was negative for the presence of marijuana or metabolite (R294: 23;
105). But see David Sandler, Expert and Opinion Testimony of Law Enforcement
Officers Regarding Identification of Drug Impaired Drivers, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 151,
155 (2002), (noting that a negative blood result does not necessarily rule out drug
impairment or support that the individual is drug free). The final toxicology report was
not included in the record prior to defendant pleading guilty.
For purposes of the motion to suppress, defendant admitted that he failed the field
tests and exhibited signs of impairment (R. 51-53). In fact, he argued that his impairment
rendered him incapable of knowingly waiving his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (R. 66-68). See Add. C. The court found that there was "no
testimony whatsoever in any way that Mr. Bertoch was incapacitated to a point that he
couldn't understand Miranda and denied the motion to suppress his post-Miranda
statements (R. 287: 5). Defendant has abandoned this argument on appeal.
6
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rights and transported to jail (id.). During booking, the jailers removed a small plastic case
from defendant, which defendant admitted contained methamphetamine (R294: 10-12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pat-Down: Defendant conceded below that the stop and pat-down were justified. He
challenged only the seizure of the non-weapon contraband in his pockets, which seizure he
alleged occurred during the weapons pat-down. The trial court properly rejected the
argument because it found that no item was removed during the pat-down, but only incident
to defendant's subsequent arrest. Defendant does not challenge this finding on appeal.
Instead, for the first time, he attacks the weapons pat-down. Because defendant did
not challenge the justification for the pat-down below, the issue is not preserved or reserved
by the conditional plea. Consequently, the entirety of defendant's Point I, which is
predicated on the alleged illegality of the pat-down, should be summarily rejected.
Moreover, even if, arguendo, defendant's challenge on appeal were preserved and the
pat-down determined to be illegal, defendant would not prevail. The trial court found that
no physical evidence was obtained as a result of the pat-down, but only independently
incident to the arrest and vehicle impound. Consequently, whether a weapons pat-down was
permissible or not, the net outcome of the suppression ruling is the same: the drugs and
paraphernalia were lawfully seized and, therefore, are admissible against defendant.
Pre-Miranda Statements: A temporary traffic detention does not constitute "custody"
for Fifth Amendment purposes and, therefore, questioning during such an encounter does not
require a Miranda warning. Additionally, regardless of the nature of the setting, a suspect's
7
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volunteered statements do not implicate Miranda. Here, the trial court correctly denied
defendant's motion to suppress his pve-Miranda statements because the statements were
volunteered and/or did not result from custodial interrogation.
ARGUMENT
POINTI
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE A CHALLENGE TO
THE WEAPONS PAT-DOWN BELOW, HE MAY NOT ATTACK ITS
VALIDITY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits a defendant to enter a guilty
plea while reserving his right to appeal an "adverse determination of any specified pretrial
motion." See Add. A. Reservation of the right to appeal, however, does not excuse
preservation of the issue raised. See State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^ 8-11, 86 P.3d 759
(reaffirming that preservation rule applies to all issues raised on appeal and holding that a
challenge under one subsection of a rule did not preserve a challenge under a different
subsection of same rule); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah 1993) (holding that
preservation rule's specificity requirement is not met by casually referencing an issue below,
but requires active presentation to the trial court of relevant legal authority and evidence);
State v. Rochell, 850 P.2d 480,484 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (strictly applying preservation rule
in appeal from conditional plea and refusing to consider suppression theory raised for the
first appeal). Indeed, rule 1 l(i) only permits appeals from pretrial motions presented to and
ruled upon by the trial court. Cf. State v. Rivera, 9A3 P.2d 1344,1345-46 (Utah 1997); State
v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1994) (both holding that "plain language55 of rule 11
8
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permits conditional appeals from the denial of any specified pretrial motion). In sum, rule
1 l(i) expands the category of potential appellants, but does not diminish their obligation to
preserve arguments below or face waiver on appeal. See Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold Isreal,
5 Criminal Procedure § 21.6(b) n.51 (2d Ed & 2004 Pocket Part).
Here, defendant impermissibly argues for the first time on appeal that the weapons
pat-down conducted pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was not justified (Br.Aplt.
at 15-25).1 On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously found the pat-down
7

Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, concluded that "[w]hen an officer is justified in believing
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed
and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm." The Court held that if an officer could articulate a reasonable basis to suspect an
individual was armed, the officer could frisk "every portion of the [person's] body,"
including patting down the individual's "arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin
and area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs down to the feet." Id. at 11
n.13 (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 78
P.3d 590 (extensively discussing suspicion necessary for Terry frisk).
Here, the trooper did not conduct a full Terry frisk, but briefly patted down
defendant's waistline and his shirt and pants pockets for weapons before proceeding to
the field sobriety tests (R294: 17). See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 843 (5th
Cir.) (recognizing that a similar pat-down was less that the "intrusive exploration of a
detainee's body .. . envisioned in Terry), cert denied, 513 U.S. 829 (1994). During the
preliminary hearing, the trooper briefly stated his safety concerns based on his suspicions
that the vehicle was stolen and defendant was impaired (R294: 7-8, 15, 17). See State v.
Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1992) (reaffirming supreme court's recognition
in State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985), that "'it is not unlikely that a person
engaged in stealing another person's property would arm himself against the possibility
that another person will appear unexpectedly and object strenuously'"). When defendant
subsequently moved to suppress, he did not contest the reasonableness or sufficiency of
the officer's explanation (R. 59-61, 175-76) and, consequently, there was no need to
present additional evidence. See Richins, 2004 UT App 36, ^flf 1 & 11 (recognizing that
when a defendant fails to raise an issue, the court has no reason to take evidence on the
issue or enter full findings to resolve it).
9
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permissible without considering the totality of the circumstances (id).

According to

defendant, the DUI arrest would not have occurred "but for" the illegal pat-down and,
consequently, the physical and oral evidence seized incident to that arrest must also be
suppressed (Br.Aplt at 29). Additionally, defendant claims that his statements at the scene
were not voluntary, but compelled through exploitation of the police illegality and, therefore,
must be suppressed (Br.Aplt. at 30-36). None of these arguments were presented to the trial
court. See Add. C.
Below, defendant did not seek an evidentiary hearing or oral argument (R295: 2-5).
Instead, he submitted his motion to suppress on his extensive memoranda, a transcript of the
preliminary hearing, and the police reports (R. 47-136, 172-80). See Add. C. Yet, in some
38 pages of legal memoranda, defendant never attacked the weapons pat-down, only the
seizure of the pipe and baggie (R. 59-62, 64-66, 173-76). Moreover, he did not simply fail
to attack the pat-down, he affirmatively conceded its permissibility (id.). His claim below
was that the permissible weapons search did not justify the seizure of the non-weapon
contraband (R. 64-66). According to defendant, this case was indistinguishable from
Maryland v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), in which the validity of the pat-down search
was also not challenged, only its scope (id.). In Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 377, the United
States Supreme Court accepted without analysis the reasonableness of the Terry frisk
because Dickerson did not challenge it. The Court only addressed the issue of when nonweapon contraband could be seized during a weapons frisk. See id. at 378. The Court
concluded that contraband could be seized if its illegal character was immediately apparent,
10
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without resort to further search. See id. at 373-76. Based on this holding, defendant argued
below:
Applying Dickerson to this case, then, Trooper Witte could conduct a Terry
frisk to determine whether Mr. Bertoch was carrying a weapon but could not
seize an item that was not a weapon (and that could have been a lawful
tobacco pipe), then continue to search the pipe located in the left pocket by
searching the right pocket and seizing a "small baggie" which was clearly not
a weapon and constituted no threat to Trooper Witte's safety or the safety of
anyone else.
(R. 65-66) (emphasis added). See also R. 59-62,173-76 for defendant's similar concessions.
Defendant's Dickerson argument was legally correct, but factually inaccurate. The
trooper admitted that he strongly suspected the pipe in defendant's pocket was contraband,
but could not positively determine whether it was a tobacco or marijuana pipe from its feel
(R294: 9, 17-22). Consequently, Dickerson did preclude its removal. But defendant's
underlying factual assumption—that the pipe and baggie were actually removed and seized
during the pat-down—was incorrect. The preliminary hearing testimony established and the
trial court correctly found that the pipe and baggie were not removed until defendant failed
the field tests and was arrested for DUI (R294: 9; R287: 4). Their removal was, therefore,
independent of the pat-down and solely incident to defendant's lawful arrest (R287:4). See
State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^ 14,994 P.2d 1278; State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1249
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) (both recognizing that when a driver is
arrested for any offense, including a misdemeanor offense, a search of the driver and vehicle
may be conducted incident to the arrest).

11
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Defendant also asserted below that he was in "custody" from the inception of the stop
when the trooper smelled alcohol on his breath (R. 58-59). Because a Miranda warning was
not given, defendant claimed that his ensuing statements—that he drank two beers, smoked
marijuana the night before, and had a marijuana pipe and marijuana in his pockets—must be
suppressed (R. 58-59). See discussion, Point II

He did not argue below that these

statements were involuntary (id.). Nor did he argue that his detention was unlawful (id.).
To the contrary, defendant conceded that the license plate violation supported the stop and
detention and that his "skinhead" appearance unfairly enhanced the officer's suspicions that
the vehicle was stolen (R295: 3; R. 71-76, 178-79).8
In sum, the thrust of defendant's arguments below was that the pipe and marijuana
should be suppressed because they were non-weapon contraband seized during an otherwise
legitimate Terry weapons search, and that his statements at the scene should be suppressed
because he was effectively under arrest once the trooper smelled alcohol on his breath (R.
174-76). None of defendant's arguments below challenged the validity of the stop, detention,
pat-down, or arrest. See Add. C. Consequently, the trial court only summarily noted that the
stop, detention, pat-down, and arrest were "appropriate" or "lawful," and then proceeded to
specifically rule on the arguments defendant raised, to wit: (1) whether defendant's at-the-

8

At the time of the stop, defendant was heavily tattooed and his head was shaved
(R 71-76, 178-79). According to defendant, he looked like a "skinhead" or
"straightedger," which prevented the officer from giving him the "benefit of the doubt"
(id.). The trial court found no basis to conclude that the trooper unfairly profiled
defendant based on his appearance (R287: 6). Defendant does not challenge this finding
on appeal.
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scene statements should be suppressed because no Miranda warning was given; (2) whether
non-weapon items were seized during the course of the weapons pat-down; (3) whether the
zig-zag papers were illegally seized; (4) whether defendant was too impaired to waive his
Miranda rights after he was arrested, (5) whether the methamphetamine should be
suppressed because the police varied in their descriptions of its plastic case, and (6) whether
the detention continued due to improper profiling because defendant appeared to be a
"skinhead" (R287: 3-6; R285). See Add. B. The court correctly and properly rejected
defendant's claims (id.).
On appeal, defendant abandons his arguments below, but for the claim that his at-thescene statements should be suppressed because no Miranda warning was given. See
discussion, Point II. He still concedes that the stop was proper, but now argues that the DUI
arrest was invalid because the field sobriety tests were "subjective" and "the DUI arrest was
determined by the results of the illegal frisk rather than the results of the field sobriety tests"
(Br.Aplt. at 28-29). Not only is this argument not preserved, it contradicts defendant's
admissions and arguments in the trial court. Compare Br.Aplt. at 28-29, with R. 66-68.
Similarly, defendant abandons his trial court argument that the contraband was
impermissibly seized during an otherwise permissible weapons pat-down (Br.Aplt. at 6-7,
28).

Instead, defendant now argues that the weapons pat-down was illegal and

everything—the statements, arrest, and contraband—should be suppressed because they were
obtained through exploitation of its illegality (Br.Aplt. at 12-35). See State v. Thurrnan, 846
P.2d 1256, 1262-64 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that where a prior police illegality proceeds
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an otherwise valid search, the prosecution must establish that the legal search did not occur
through exploitation of the illegality). Defendant's Point I, therefore, is predicated on one
claim of error, that the trial court failed to fully consider the totality of the circumstances of
the detention before stating the pat-down was lawful {Br.Aplt at 12-35). But defendant's
own actions negated any need to examine these circumstances: defendant admitted that a
weapons pat-down was justified (R. 59-61, 173-76), and, therefore, the trial court had no
reason to further question its justification. See Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f^f 8 & 11
(recognizing that a trial court is not provided notice that a full ruling is required when a
defendant fails to raise a specific objection).
This Court should summarily reject consideration of defendant's unpreserved
arguments. But even if assuming, arguendo, that the challenge to the pat-down was
preserved and this Court determined it illegal, defendant would still not prevail on appeal for
purposes of withdrawing his conditional plea.
The trial court found that no items were obtained as a result of the pat-down, but were
seized independently incident to defendant's subsequent DUI arrest (R287: 4). On appeal,
defendant does not challenge this factual finding, but claims—for the first time—that the
DUI arrest was not the result of his failed sobriety tests, but was a product of the allegedly
unlawful pat-down {Br.Aplt at 28-31). Aside from being unpreserved, the argument has no
evidentiary basis and is contradicted by defendant's factual admissions below. Compare
Br.Aplt at 28-31, with R. 59-62, 173-76. Consequently, even if the pat-down were
determined to be illegal, only suppression of defendant's statements made during the pat-

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

down would result. Accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262-64. However, this result would not
entitle defendant to vacation of his guilty plea.
Rule 1 l(i) requires a defendant to "prevail on appeal" before his conditional guilty
plea may be withdrawn {Add. A). "To prevail on appeal" is a term of art, which means more
than simply prevailing on an issue. SeeA.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy,
2002 UT App 73, f 16, 47 P.3d 92. Utah recognizes various tests for determining who
prevails, but all the standards are based on a common sense comparison of what a party
sought to gain with what the party actually gained, that is, a party's "net judgment."See J.
Pochynok Co., Inc. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, f 12, 80 P.3d 563; Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1989). Even under the most
generous standard, a party claiming to have prevailed must "at a minimum . . . be able to
point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between [the
parties]" in a significant and not "purely technical or de minimus" way. See Texas State
Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 791-92 (1989) (in
context of civil rights claim). Moreover, when multiple issues are involved, a party must win
more than a single claim since there can never be two "prevailing parties." See R. T. Nielson
Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,ffif22-26, 40 P.3d 1119.
Rule ll(i) does not require that a reserved pretrial motion be dispositive of the
prosecution of the case. See Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1345-46; Montoya, 887 P.2d at 859-60.
But the rule does require that a defendant prevail on the appeal of the reserved motion. See
Add. A. Stated differently, a defendant, who conditionally pleads guilty, must obtain on
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appeal a "net judgment" in his favor or otherwise significantly change the relationship of the
parties in connection with the reserved motion. Cf. Rivera, 943 P.2d at 1346 (recognizing
that a conditional plea should be permitted to be withdrawn when the appellate ruling places
the parties on new footing in any negotiations of the case). Thus, winning one part of a
multi-issue motion to suppress is not "prevailing on appeal" unless the "win" significantly
changes the outcome of the trial court's denial of the motion. Here, the legality of the patdown does not impact the validity of the searches incident to arrest, impound, and booking
and, consequently, does not change the overall outcome of the motion to suppress. See State
v. Zesiger, 2003 UT App 37, f 11, 65 P.3d 314 (reaffirming "independent source doctrine"
which precludes suppression where evidence is in fact obtained from a source independent
of any illegality). See also State v. James, 2000 UT 80,fflj14-16, 13 P.3d 576 (clarifying
that where evidence would hypothetically have been inevitably lawfully discovered,
suppression is not warranted).
In sum, defendant's arguments are waived and, even the arguments were preserved,
resolution of them would not result in a net change in the denial of the motion to suppress.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE A MIRANDA WARNING WAS NOT
REQUIRED DURING THE NON-CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATIVE
DETENTION
Below, defendant argued that his statements at the scene should be suppressed
because they were elicited without benefit of a Miranda warning (R. 58-59, 174). He
claimed that from the time the officer smelled alcohol on his breath, he was effectively in
16
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custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment (R. 58-59).p On appeal, defendant asserts this
same claim with a factual modification (Br.Aplt. at 36-40). He now claims that he was in
custody and effectively under arrest "from the moment Witte felt the pipe" {Br.Aplt at 39).
The trial court's ruling properly negates both arguments.
The court found that defendant was not arrested until he failed the field sobriety tests
(R287: 3). The court concluded that up until the arrest, defendant was detained, but not in
custody for Fifth Amendment purposes (id.). Defendant knew he was being temporarily
detain while the trooper investigated the unattached license plate violation and his possible
impairment. He also must have recognized that field sobriety tests are a routine part of such
an investigation. Though the officer was armed, he did not draw his weapon or otherwise
threaten defendant (R294: 15-16). The encounter was low key, including the pat-down,
which was kept to the most minimal level (R294: 7-9,14-16). See note 7, supra. When the
trooper discovered the pipe in defendant's pocket, he did not accuse defendant of illegal
activity, but simply stated, "This is a pipe" (R294: 9, 19). Defendant then volunteered that
it was a marijuana pipe and that marijuana was in his other pocket (id.; R287: 3). The
trooper did not remove the items from defendant, but proceeded with the field sobriety tests

9

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, requires that a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights be
explained prior to a custodial interrogation. A suspect is "in custody" for purposes of
Miranda if his "freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal
arrest.'" State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). Traffic detentions are generally considered noncustodial and, therefore, do not implicate Miranda. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 429-30;
State v. Zepeda, 2003 UT App 298 (unpublished opinion) (attached to Addendum D
pursuant to rule 30(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).
17
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(R294: 9, 24; R287; 4). When defendant failed the tests "miserably," he was arrested and
handcuffed (R294: 8,23). Nothing in this scenario suggests that defendant was in "custody"
for Miranda purposes, though he subjectively recognized he was "caught." Compare State
v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (holding that custody did not occur when a
driver, detained on a public street, performed field sobriety tests); Zepeda, 2003 UT App
298, \ 2 (analyzing various Berkemer-Mirquet factors and concluding that questioning a
driver about possible drug usage did not render the traffic stop custodial), with Mirquet, 914
P.2d at 1147-48 (holding that accusatory questioning of a driver, detained in a police vehicle,
including ordering the driver to hand over his drugs, constituted custody and required a
Miranda warning).
Whether in custody or not, the trial court also found that defendant's statements
concerning the marijuana, the pipe, and his marijuana usage were volunteered (R287: 3).
Below, defendant never claimed otherwise, only that his detention was custodial at its
inception (R. 58-59). See Add. C. Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues that
the presence of the armed officer overcame his free will and made his prz-Miranda
statements involuntary. Compare Br.Aplt. at 32-33, with i?. 68 & 174. Because this
challenge is not preserved, its consideration on appeal is waived.
In sum, the trial court correctly denied the suppression of defendant's pve-Miranda
statements on the ground that they were volunteered and/or made during non-custodial
interrogation.

18
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CONCLUSION
Defendant raises only unpreserved or non-meritorious issues and, therefore, provides
no basis to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. His conviction should
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / i ^ d a y of April, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were mailed to LORI J. SEPPI, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, attorneys for Defendant/Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111, this /9

day of April, 2004.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a
plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent
of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for
a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrirnination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis
is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial
risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the EnDigitized
by the Howard
Hunter
Law Library,
Clark Law School,
glish
language,
it willW.be
sufficient
thatJ. Reuben
the statement
has BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
been read or translated
to the defendant

Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw the nlea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally
ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Coda.
Ann. § 77-16a-103.
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MOTOR VEHICLES
PART 4
LICENSE PLATES AND REGISTRATION INDICIA

41-la-403. Plates to be legible from 100 feet.
License plates and the required letters and numerals on
them, except the decals and the slogan, shall be of sufficient
size to be plainly readable from a distance of 100 feet during
daylight.
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on September 30, 2002)

3

THE COURT: Let's get on the record in the matter of

4

Travis Bertoch, 011919305. This is on for motions.

5

heard argument last week, took it under advisement again so I

6

could renew —

7

have done.

8
9
10

The Court

or review again all of the memorandums, which I

I think we excused Mr. Bertoch from being here today,
didn't we?

Or is he supposed to be here?

MS. HINMAN:

I believe, unfortunately, you said he

11

needed to be here, your Honor, and I tried to reach him, and I

12

also spoke with his brother.

13

calendar, and I haven't been able to reach him.

14
15
16
17

He did not have this on his

THE COURT: Okay. Well, he was here when I set it, so
we can issue a warrant—
MS. HINMAN:

Well, he was not here on Friday because

he had been excused—

18

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm going to issue a warrant

19

in the amount of $5,000, but you can cure that by just telling

20

me that you've talked to Mr. Bertoch and you've been in touch

21

with him, okay?

22

MS. HINMAN:

All right, fine. Your Honor, we expect

23

to be in West Valley City on a misdemeanor matter tomorrow

24

morning, I'm sure, if not before then.

25

THE COURT:

I will—

Okay, I just need to know that he shows up
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1

for that, okay?

2

MS. HINMAN:

Thank you very much, your Honor.

3

THE COURT: All right.

In regards to the motion, the

4

Court is going to deny defense's motions for the following

5

reasons. The first one was suppressing the statements

6

defendant made after the stop.

7

considering it to be an investigatory stop.

8
9

I'm denying it. The Court's
It was a DUI stop.

Even though he could smell alcohol — the officer
could smell alcohol — that is not enough in and of itself a

10

probable cause for an arrest. Mr. Bertoch was not under

11

arrest. This matter has been heard by Courts many times. The

12

Court did not consider him under arrest, and the questions

13

asked by the officer are preliminary investigatory questions

14

such as, "Have you been drinking," and I think in this

15

particular case Mr. Bertoch volunteered that he had a couple of

16

beers, but the Court does not feel that he was in custody, and

17

therefore Miranda had to be given before the statements could

18

be admitted.

19

Also, when the officer found the lump in his pocket

20

and stated just to Mr. Bertoch that it felt like a pipe, the

21

defendant responded on his own that it was a pipe, and then he

22

also volunteered the information that he had marijuana and —

23

I can't —

24

volunteered that he had been smoking marijuana.

25

were still investigatory questions.

I think a lighter in his other pocket.

He also

Again, these
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The Court finds that the Terry frisk was appropriate

2

and legal. Once the officer smelled alcohol and took

3

Mr. Bertoch out of the vehicle, he had a right to frisk

4

him.
I went through the prelim, I went through the

5
6

statements of the officer.

I didn't find any evidence

7

where the officer reached in his pocket and took these things

8

out.

9

and even though it could have been a pipe of tobacco or

It was Mr. Bertoch that volunteered that it was a pipe,

10

anything, at that point it didn't make a difference.

11

wasn't evidence about anything.

12

Mr. Bertoch to keep the matter —

13

material in his pockets until later.

14

There

The officer even told
the pipe and the other

I think that the initial stop was lawful because

15

the license plate was unlawfully displayed, and the Court of

16

Appeals and the Supreme Court have both told us that basically

17

no matter how minute, if a traffic violation takes place, that

18

gives rise to probable cause for the initial stop.

19

In regards to the suppression of the pipe and the

20

baggie containing a green leafy substance, the Court both

21

finds that these were taken at the search incident to arrest.

22

Mr. Bertoch was later arrested.

23

asked him to empty his pockets or to take out what was in his

24

pockets, and that's when they were brought out.

25

At that point, the officer

In the suppression of the zig-zag papers, the Court
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1

denies that motion.

2

found during the inventory search of the vehicle after the

3

arrest was made, or it was found in the search incident to

4

arrest at the time that Mr. Bertoch was arrested, even though

5

it was done by a different officer.

6

The Court either feels that one, it was

Even though —

and again, even though the papers

7

themselves are not illegal, I mean these are questions for

8

the jury whether they think that zig-zag papers are drug

9

paraphernalia or not.

Based on the other evidence found and

10

Mr. Bertoch's admitting he smoked marijuana, the Court can

11

surely believe that it's for the use of marijuana, but I'm not

12

the fact finder in this particular case.

13

whether to suppress them or not, so it will be allowed.

14

I'm only asked

Suppressing all the other statements because

15

Mr. Bertoch did not understand the Miranda warnings, I have

16

heard no testimony whatsoever in any way that Mr. Bertoch was

17

incapacitated to a point that he couldn't understand Miranda.

18

He said that he understood it, and he then proceeded to ask the

19

questions.

20

think they've met that burden.

21

I think that burden is on the defense and I don't

Suppression of the battery case with the meth.

Yes,

22

there is some confusion as to whether it was a plastic case, a

23

battery case that contained meth or a clear plastic case —

24

white —

25

case containing meth.

excuse me, some of it was.

It was a white battery

In other reports it was a clear case
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that contained a white powdery substance.
One, I don't find those to be that much of a

2
3

discrepancy between what is being described.

Two, I think

4

that that again is a question for the trier of fact as to

5

whether they believe that was the particular battery case

6

that was found on Mr. Bertoch or not.

7

Also, in regards to the chain, the Court isn't

8

necessarily agreeing that it will come in, I'm just not

9

suppressing it. If each individual officer can establish

10

that that was the piece of evidence that they found and they

11

handled, then the chain allows it to come in and then the

12

jury gives it what weight they seem to think it deserves.
Just because there's a misidentification —

13
14

even a misidentification.

15

same piece of evidence.

16

grounds to suppress the evidence.

It's a different description of the
I don't think in and of itself that is

In regards to the stopping —

17

it's not

a profile stop because

18

Mr. Bertoch had his head shaved and because the officer might

19

have thought that he was a straight-edger, I've just heard

20

no —

21

there's been nothing to that.
There was a legitimate traffic violation that took

22

place, and the officer stopped him for a legitimate reason. If

23

the officer didn't have a traffic violation and yes, he just

24

stopped him for no apparent reason whatsoever, then maybe the

25

Court would look more seriously at that, but based on what I've
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1 I heard there's nothing to show that the stop was initially
2

unlawful and was therefore a profile stop.

3

So based on that, the Court is going to deny each and

4

every one of defense's motions.

5

trial?

6

COURT CLERK:

7 I

THE COURT:
COURT CLERK:

Do you want to set it for

It is set for trial.

It is set for next week, okay.
No, this week, Wednesday, Thursday and

9 I Friday.
10

THE COURT: Okay.

So as it stands right now it will

11

go to trial, depending on where it sits with the other — I

12

don't — we haven't even seen everybody as to the trials that

13

are set for Wednesday, so I don't know what place setting it

14

has.

15

COURT CLERK:

Right now it's No. 2.

16

THE COURT: Right now it's a No. 2 setting.

17

MR. BERTOCH: Okay.

18

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

19

(Hearing concluded)
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Utah Highway Patrol ("UHP") Trooper Christopher C. Witte first observed the
Defendant Travis Bertoch "EB, SR201 onto 1-15 and then onto I80." {DUI Report
Section Number: RID1601-0873 signed by Trooper Witte, Exhibit ["Ex."] A,1 see also
Ex. N., a chronology showing dates and times set forth in the Exhibits.}
2. "On Wednesday the 19th September 2001, at approximately 2100 hours I was traveling
eastbound on SR 201. Shortly thereafter I observed a maroon Ford Contour with a
rear license plate that was lying on the right side of the back window's ledge. I
followed the vehicle onto southbound SR 15(1-15), then onto eastbound SR 80 (I--80)"
"at Mile Post No. 124." {Utah Highway Patrol Incident Report for Case Number 16-010873, p. 2, Ex. D, UHP Incident Report2; Ex. B; Information, Ex. C , Counts I -IV.}
3. Trooper Witte stopped Mr. Bertoch (the "Stop") on Wednesday, September 19, 2001 at
"MILITARY TIME

2119." {DUI summons and Citations State of Utah Citation No. D

384861 signed by Trooper Witte, see also Ex. B, Summons; see also Ex. A.}
4. The Incident Report describes Mr. Bertoch's hair color as "Blonde" and states that he
had "tattoes [sic: tattoos] oyer both arms." {Ex. A, p. 1; but see Ex. N: Mr. Bertoch's
brother states that Mr. Travis Bertoch's head was shaved at the time.}
5. Trooper Witte states "The subject's vehicle rear plate was laid inside the vehicle in the
rear window. It was not securely fastened to the outside of the vehicle." {Ex. B,
Section V.}
6. At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte admitted he "did not run [the license plate
number] at that time" of the Stop, before conducting a "Terry frisk" (described below.)
{Testimony of Trooper Witte at Preliminary Hearing on taped transcript, March 14,

1

The DUI Report states "Time Prepared: 0059," approximately one hour after midnight during the morning after
the initial stop. {Ex. A, p. 1.}
2

The Incident Report indicates the Incident Date as "09/19/2001 21:03" and that the report was "Completed
09/20/2001 00:25." The Incident Report states "This report is accurate:" followed by space for the "Reporting
Officer's Signature" and is signed "Christopher Witte" with the date "9/20/01 12:25:00 AM." {Ex. D, pp. 1,3.}
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2002, Transcript by certified court reporter to be appended as Ex. M when
completed.}3
7. After making the Stop, "I [Trooper Witte] made contact with the driver, Travis Bertoch,
and stated the reason for the stop." {Ex. D, p. 2.}
8. 1 [Trooper Witte] smelled alcohol coming from Mr. Bertoch" {Id., emphasis added.}
9. The DU1 Report states, "Odor of alcoholic beverage: present on the subject's
breath." {Ex. A, Section VII.}
70.The DUI Report states, "Speech: slow Balance: fair Signs or complaints of injury
or illness: broken right ankle a couple of times Other physical characteristics: red
blood shot eyes. Subject's tongue was tinted green with blisters on the back of his
tongue." {Id}
11.The vehicle was searched at "I-80 @ State Street" at "2129;" "Evidence: zig zag [sic,
Zig Zag] papers" are found. {Id., Section IX.}
12.Trooper Witte states: "I asked Mr. Bertoch how much he had to drink. He replied that
he had had two beers to drink. {Ex. D., p. 2.}
13. "I [Trooper Witte] removed Mr. Bertoch from the vehicle and conducted a Terry frisk"
prior to administering the Uniform Field Sobriety Tests." {Id. p. 2, emphasis added.}
14. While conducting the "Terry frisk" "I felt a hard object in the subject's left front pants
pocket." {Id., emphasis added}
15.Trooper Witte testified he had been armed with a Glock .40, a "tool" called an "ASP"
and a container with a substance he described as "pepper spray" and that Mr. Bertoch
was not free to leave from the Stop. {Ex. M.}4
3

The later report on the plate showed Travis Bertoch as the registered owner of the car. Mr. Bertoch's Driver's
License proved "VALID [,] CLASS D [with] RESTRICTIONS corrective lenses" and no endorsements. {Ex. A.}

4

Defendant requests the Court to take notice that a Glock .40 is a semiautomatic handgun. Defendant also
requests the Court to take notice that, according to an employee at Skaggs Public Safety Uniforms &
Equipment, 3828 South Main Street, Murray, UT, a well-known supplier of equipment to the law enforcement
community, the ASP is a telescoping "baton," available in three lengths when extended: 21 inches, 26 inches
and 31 inches and is thus similarly to the older-styled wooden batons commonly called "night sticks" or "billy
clubs." Because the baton "telescopes," an officer can carry it in its short or telescoped mode more easily than
the wooden batons that were long the standard issue to police officers. Trooper Witte adamantly refused to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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16.1 told Mr. Bertoch that the object was a pipe." {Id., emphasis added}
17. "He [Mr. Bertoch] informed me that it was. He also stated that he had lighters and
marijuana in his right front pants pocket. {Id., emphasis added.}
18."\ told Mr. Bertoch leave the items in his pockets." {Id.}
19. "When i [Trooper Witte] removed the subject from the vehicle to administer the FST's
[field sobriety tests] I conducted a Terry frisk on the subject. I touched his left front
pants pocket and felt a hard object. I informed him that is a pipe. He stated that it
was. Also, I continued to search the subject for the pipe and found in this [sic: his]
front right pants pocket a small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green leafy
substance" (the "Baggie") {Ex. A p. 2, emphasis added.}
20. "I [Trooper Witte] took Mr. Bertoch into custody without incident at 2119 hours." {Id.}
21. "While conducting the vehicle inventory and impound, Trooper Hopkins [backup at the
Stop] found a pack of "Zig-Zag" rolling paper. I [Trooper Witte] secured this in my
vehicle also. {Ex. A, p. 2.}
22. In the Vehicle Impound Report signed by Trooper Hopkins, the "Property in vehicle"
was "misc papers, 60 CD's, [crossed out word], cigarettes, Zig Zag, glasses." {Vehicle
Impound Report No. A 959555, Ex. E.}
23.The Vehicle Impound Report notes, in the category "Visible damage:" "No trunk lid rear end damage Rh [?] door." {Id.}
24. None of the reports signed by or attributed to Trooper Witte refer to "No trunk lid..."
{See Exs. A, B, D and other Exhibits cited below.}
25. At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte testified, in substance, that he noticed that
Mr. Bertoch's vehicle did not have a trunk lid and testified that was a "suspicion." {See
Ex. D, p. 1; Ex. M)

describe the ASP as a "club" but called it a tool, but a telescoping baton can easily be used as a "tool" in the
same manner that earlier police officers would have used a night stock or a billy club. Trooper Witte was clearly
well armed in accordance with current law enforcement practice. Mr. Bertoch was not armed. Trooper Witte was
controlling Mr. Bertoch from the moment he "removed" Mr. Bertoch from Mr. Bertoch's car. {See Ex. D.)
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26. After making the search, Trooper Witte conducted the sobriety tests and describes his
conclusions: " 1 . HGN [Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus5] 4/6 clues. Lack of smooth pursuit
in both eyes. Distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes. 2. OLS [One
Leg Stand] 2 clues. Stated his right ankle had been broken a couple of times. 1-10
seconds he swayed. 11-20 he raised his arms for balance more than 6 inches from
his side. 3. WAT [Walk and Turn]: 3 clues. Could not keep his balance twice by
stepping off the line during the instructional phase. During the first 9 steps the subject
raised his arms once and performed an improper turn by pivoting on both feet. Raised
his arms during the second 9 steps more than 6 inches from his side. 4. PBT present
for alcohol." {Ex. A, VII.}
27.Trooper Witte found "Subjects [sic: Subject's] ability to follow instructions poor."
{Id.}
28.Trooper Witte asserts that, he "(read at 2130 hours)" the statement: "Mr. BERTOCH,
do you understand that you are under arrest for: Driving under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled substance or
metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 44-6-44.6 UCA . . , ? " He states the "Response if
any:" that "subject stated confusion." {Id.}
29.Trooper Witte states he asked, "What is your response to my request that you
submit to a chemical test?" and Mr. Bertoch said, "I guess they can come take my
blood." {Id., see also the one-paged description of tests that may have been
appended to Ex. A, attached as Ex. F.}
30. After the arrest, search and tests "I [Officer Witte] transported Mr. Bertoch to the
Chevron gas station on the corner of 2100 South and State Street. We met with Patti
Wayman, who took a blood sample from Mr. Bertoch at 2205 hours...." {Ex. A, Ex. D,
p. 2.}

5

Webster's New World Dictionary, 2d College Ed., Simon & Schuster © 1982 p. 979, defines "nystagmus" as "n.
[ModL. <Gr, nystagmos, drowsiness < nystazein, to be sleepy < IE. Base *sneud-, to sleep] an involuntary, rapid
movement of the eyeball, usually from side to side."
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31Then, "I [Trooper Witte] transported Mr. Bertoch [t]o the Salt Lake County Jail to be
booked on his charges. I read Mr. Bertoch his Miranda rights at 2226 hours, and he
agreed to speak with me (see attached D.U.I, report). Deputy Brandon Peterson (J33) of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office processed Mr. Bertoch. While searching
Mr. Bertoch, Deputy Peterson (J-33) discovered a small white plastic battery container,
containing a white powdery substance. Mr. Bertoch stated that this was 'meth.'" {Id.}
32. "I [Trooper Witte] secured the white plastic battery container with it's [sic: its] contents
in my right front pants pocket. I booked Mr. Bertoch on the charges of Improper
display of License Plates, Driving Under the Influence (drugs), Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, Possession of Marijuana, and Possession of Controlled Substance. I
secured the pipe with burned residue and the "Zig-Zag" rolling paper in evidence
locker # 952 at 0019 hours at the section 16 office. I requested scientific analysis on
the white powder contents of the white plastic battery case. I also secured the white
plastic battery case in evidence locker #588 at 0025 hours at the Section 16 office.
{W-, P. 2.}6
33.The Incident Report states the "Reason for Stop" was "Traffic," the "Description of
Stop" was Improper display of rear license plate" and lists "Drugs Seized" "1 Grams
Manufactured Compartment" on each of two lines; "Other Place of Concealment" was
"pants pockets" and "Other Markings none." "Paraphernalia Seized: 1-glass pipe with
burned residue, 1-pack of 'Zig-Zag'" rolling papers." On the last line of the form under
"Subj No & Name" the typed entry is "1 Bertoch, Travis" but the "Offense" states
"Receiving Stolen Property." {Id. p. 4, SUPPLEMENTAL FACT SHEET.}7

6

The Court is requested to take notice that the Salt Lake County Jail is located at 3415 South 900 West, West
Valley City, UT 84119 and UHP "Section 16" has an "Office Address" at 1842 West 2770 South, Suite 10, West
Valley City, UT 84119." {Ex. D, p. 1.} The two addresses are approximately 2 1/8 miles apart.
7

The statement "Receiving Stolen Property" on p. 4 of Ex. D is prejudicially outside the context of this case
since p. 1 of Ex. D reports the identifies Mr. Bertoch as the "Registered Owner." Neither the Information {Ex. C}
nor any other document produced for discovery alleges anything was stolen or that Mr. Bertoch received stolen
property. Consequently, this irrelevancy should be stricken.
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34. Trooper Witte states "Arrest and baker at 2119 hours. Miranda at 2226 hours." {Id. p.
3-}
35. "I [Trooper Witte] served notice on subject Time served: by me to his left front
pants pocket @ 2232 hours at the jail." {Id. p. 4.}
36. The DUI report states that Trooper Witte's signature was typed at his direction on
"Date: 9/20/01 Time: 0110." {Id. p. 4.}
37. A UHP "SECTION 16 'SPECIAL OPERATIONS EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY REPORT" form

referring to Locker Number 592 lists three items, "1 glass pipe with burned residue 2
small clear baggy with green leafy substance 3 "Zig-Zag" rolling papers" with a "CHAIN
OF POSSESSION:

From Suspect To Troopers vehicle Date: 09/19/01 Time: @ 2119" and

"From: Troopers' Vehicle To: locker #592 Date 09/20/01 Time: @0019." {Ex. G.}
38. A second UHP

"SECTION

16

'SPECIAL OPERATIONS'"

form referring to Locker Number

588 lists "1 small, clear, plastic battery case containing a white powdery substance"
with a "CHAIN OF POSSESSION: From Subject To: Deputy B. Peterson J-33 Date:
09/19/01 Time: @ 2245 From: Deputy B. Peterson J-33 To: Trpr C. Witte 431 Date:
09/19/01 Time: @ 2245 From Trp Witte 431 To: locker # 588 Date: 09/20/01 Time: @
0025 From Locker to Crime Lab Date: 9/20/01 Time: @ 1000." {Ex. H, emphasis
added.}
39.The Preliminary Toxicology Report dated "10/05/2001" indicates Mr. Bertoch's blood
alcohol level was "0.01 "and that drug screening test results were "Marijuana or
metabolite Blood NEG." {Ex. I ["eye"].} Driving with a blood-alcohol level of.08 grams
or more is illegal in Utah. U.C.A. 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i).
40.The Probable Cause Statement appended to the Information states: "Your affiant
bases probable cause on the following: The statement of Utah Highway Patrol
Trooper Witte that on September 19, 2001, he observed the defendant, Travis
Bertoch, operating a vehicle at I-80 and State Street in Salt Lake County. Trooper
Witte observed that the rear license plate was not securely fastened to the outside of
the vehicle and was lying in the rear window. Trooper Witte initiated a traffic stop and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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observed the defendant behind the wheel. Trooper Witte detected and odor of alcohol
on the defendant's breath. The defendant had slow speech and bloodshot eyes. The
defendant admitted that he had consumed two beers and smoked marijuana. The
defendant failed the field sobriety tests. A blood test indicated a blood/alcohol level of
.01. Trooper Witte performed a Terry frisk and located a pipe in the defendant's right
front pants pocket. Trooper Witte also located a plastic baggie containing a green
leafy substance. The defendant admitted that the substance was marijuana. Upon
searching the defendant's vehicle, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Hopkins located a
pack of zigzag rolling papers. As the defendant was booked into jail, Jail Staff located
a plastic container with a white powdery substance. The defendant admitted that the
substance was methamphetamine. The substance was sent to the Utah State crime
Lab where methamphetamine was identified in the in the plastic container." {Ex. C,
emphasis added.)
41. In the "Salt Lake County No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet," with a "PRINT DATE: 09/19/01
TIME:

23:12," Trooper Witte states, in relevant part: "I OBSERVED THE SUBJECT TRAVELING

EAST ON I-80 FROM 1-1 5. THE SUBJECT'S VEHICLE HAD THE REAR LICENSE PLATE DISPLAYED
IN THE REAR WINDOW. I STOPPED THE SUBJECT ON EB I-80 JUST PRIOR TO THE STATE STREET
OFF RAMP. I MADE CONTACT WITH THE SUBJECT AND DETECTED THE ODOR OF AN ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGE FROM THE SUBJECT. I ASKED THE SUBJECT HOW MUCH HE HAD TO DRINK, AND HE
REPLIED THAT HE HAD HAD 2 BEERS. I REMEOVED THE SUBJECT FROM HIS VEHICLE TO
PERFORM UFST'S. PRIOR TO THE TEST, I CONDUCTED A "TERRY FRISK". THIS REVEALED A
GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS POCKET, AND A SMALL BAGGY OF
A GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE IN THE RIGHT FRONT PANTS POCKET. I ASKED THE SUBJECT WHEN
HE HAD SMOKED MARIJUANA LAST. SUBJECT STATED THAT HE HAD SMOKED IT THE NIGHT
BEFORE AT ABOUT 7 O'CLOCK. I ADMINISTERED THE UFST'S, WHICH THE SUBJECT FAILED.
THE SUBJECTS [SIC, SUBJECT'S]TOUNGE [SIC: TONGUE] WAS TINTED GREEN AND HAD
BLISTERS ON THE BACK OF THE TOUNGE [SIC: TONGUE]. I ARRESTED THE SUBJECT FOR DUI
AND POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND PARAPHERNALIA. ... I TRANSPORTED THE SUBJECT TO
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THE CHEVRON AT 2 1 0 0 SOUTH AND STATE STREET, WHERE A BLOOD SAMPLE WAS TAKEN
FROM THE SUBJECT. I THEN TRANSPORTED THE SUBJECT TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR
BOOKING. WHILE DEPUTY BRANDON PETERSON WAS SEARCHING THE SUBJECT AT
APPROXIMATELY 2 2 4 5 HOURS, HE DISCOVERED A SMALL WHITE BATTERY CASE CONTAINING A
WHITE POWEDER. WHEN ASKED BY DEPUTY PETERSON, THE SUBJECT STATED THAT THE
SUBSTANCE WAS 'METH'. I AMENDED THE CHARGES ON THE SUBJECT."{Salt L a k e C o u n t y

No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet, Ex. J, emphasis added.)
42. The Witness and Evidence list refers to the white powder as "evidence" to be
produced. {Ex. N.}
43. At the Preliminary Hearing, a toxicology report allegedly identifying the white powder
as methamphetamine was admitted without objection by Defendant's previous
attorney. No copy of the report has been produced as of the date of this
Memorandum, although a copy is being requested and will be submitted as Ex. P if or
when received.
44. Mr. Bertoch had shaved his head and was not blonde at the time of the incident and
had a painful crushed toe that affected his walking. {Ex. L}
ARGUMENT
STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY
MR. BERTOCH AT THE PLACE OF THE STOP
MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
Trooper Witte followed Mr. Bertoch from State Road 201 near Redwood Road, onto I15 from State Road 201 and then onto I-80, before stopping Mr. Bertoch at Mile Marker 124,
approximately 500 feet west of the State Street exit off I-80. The Court is requested to take
notice that the distance from Redwood Road (approximately 1700 West) to the location of the
Stop is approximately 2 miles. Since Trooper Witte saw the Bertoch car at least by 2103 but
did not stop Mr. Bertoch until 2119, Trooper Witte had approximately 16 minutes to observe a
car traveling about 2 miles, which would suggest that the overall speed was less than 10
miles per hour through the State Road, freeway entrances and freeway distances, a speed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that would have given Trooper Witte ample time to observe the car and driver he followed.
Trooper Witte wrote in his reports and testified that he observed that the license plate on Mr.
Bertoch's car was not properly displayed, a factor he apparently was able to observe as soon
as he observed the rear end of the car, especially since Trooper Witte testified at the
Preliminary Hearing that the absence of a trunk lid was a "suspicion." Strangely, he never
mentioned his "suspicion" in any of the reports he prepared the night of and after the arrest.
Only Trooper Hopkins, who searched the car, felt the absence of the trunk lid important
enough to record - but was preparing an impound report.
Driving with an improperly displayed license plate is a Class C Misdemeanor,
ordinarily handled by the issuance of a summons and citation. Yet Trooper Witte stated he
"removed" Mr. Bertoch from his car when Trooper Witte made the Stop. Trooper Witte
testified that Mr. Bertoch was not free to leave the location of the Stop.
Trooper Witte was armed with a handgun, a "tool" [apparently a telescoping baton] and
pepper spray.8 Trooper Witte found Mr. Bertoch to be "slow" and taken into custody without
incident. Mr. Bertoch was clearly under the control of a law enforcement officer from the time
the Stop was initiated at 2119. In addition, Trooper Witte had "backup" from Trooper
Hopkins, who was at the site of the Stop at least by 2129 when he conducted a search of Mr.
Bertoch's car.9
The testimony and written reports from Trooper Witte show Mr. Bertoch became a
suspect and a target of investigation for unlawful activity by 2103 when Trooper Witte first
observed him going eastbound on State Road 201, near Redwood Road. Nonetheless,
Trooper Witte did not give Mr. Bertoch a Miranda warning or ask Mr. Bertoch if he understood
his rights under Miranda but still wanted to speak to the Trooper until 2226, at least 107
minutes after the actual Stop. The statements attributed to Mr. Bertoch during that entire
period, prior to the receipt of Miranda warnings but when he was in custody and under the
8

The Court is requested to take notice that a "slow" person (as Trooper Witte says he found Mr. Bertoch) who
has been "removed" from his car by a well-armed Trooper would be ill advised to try to leave the Stop.

9

Trooper Witte's testimony indicates that he did not need the assistance of Trooper Hopkins to make the arrest
but was, by himself, able to control Mr. Bertoch, making Trooper Hopkins free to search the car.
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control of Trooper Witte, must therefore be suppressed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).10 These alleged statements, according to Trooper Witte, include his alleged
statements about having drunk beers, having smoked marijuana, having marijuana and
lighters in his pocket and allegedly agreeing the tube Trooper Witte felt in Mr. Bertoch's left
pocket (but continued to search for in Mr. Bertoch's right pocket) was the kind of pipe Trooper
Witte said it was. Trooper Witte had an unarmed man who was driving a car without a trunk
lid but with a license plate Trooper Witte chose not to "run" when Trooper Witte arrested him.

THE PARAPHERNALIA (PIPE) AND
THE "BAGGIE" OF GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE
MUST BE SUPPRESSED
Trooper Witte reports in writing and testified at the Preliminary Hearing that Mr.
Bertoch told him, among the statements that must be suppressed under Miranda, that he had
marijuana and a lighter in his right hand pocket - after Trooper Witte alleges that he was able
to feel a tube or pipe through Mr. Bertoch's trousers during the course of the Terry frisk.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) permits a police officer to perform a pat down to be
sure a suspect is not armed - this has become, in the argot of Utah law enforcement - a
search performed for "officer's safety." Trooper Witte testified at the Preliminary Hearing that
he initiated the "frisk" because of "officer's safety," then later testified on cross examination
that he had been "rear-ended" twice when he had previously made stops of other vehicles in
the course of his service with the UHP since his appointment in 1997.11

The importance and application of Miranda are so well known that no further citation is required. The only
possible exception to the suppression of statements during the pre-Miranda conversation might, arguendo, be
Mr. Bertoch's statement, in substance, allowing a blood sample to be taken because of the implied consent
doctrines that allegedly attach to the driving privilege. Since the Lab Report was negative for marijuana and
metabolites and since the blood alcohol reading was .01 (some .07 below the statutory impairment quantity), the
consent to the blood test is exculpatory. Cases following and distinguishing Miranda are, we submit, inapposite
to the specific factual situation in this case - as reported by the arresting Trooper. Both the United States
Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment application of the Fifth Amendment to the States and the Utah Constitution
protections against self-incrimination apply to Mr. Bertoch at the Stop.
Although searching for weapons in a pat-down or frisk under Terry is understandable, Trooper Witte's
testimony that he had been "rear-ended" twice during stops has nothing to do with patting down a person who
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the course of the pat down, Trooper Witte says he was able to feel a "pipe" through
Mr. Bertoch's pants pocket- on the left-hand side. Trooper Witte then, allegedly, continues
his search because he was looking for the pipe. He states:
When I removed the subject from the vehicle to administer the FST's I conducted a
Terry frisk on the subject. I touched his left front pants pocket and felt a hard object I
informed him that is a pipe. [Alleged statement of Mr. Bertoch suppressed under
Miranda] Also, I continued to search the subject for the pipe and found in this [sic: his]
right pants pocket a small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green leafy
substance.
The Court should notice that a "small clear plastic sandwich baggie containing a green
leafy substance" would not feel like a weapon. The Court should also notice that Trooper
Witte's search of Mr. Bertoch's right pants pocket involved a sufficient amount of touching
and feeling to locate, and apparently to withdraw, the small baggie.12
After feeling a hard object in Mr. Bertoch's left from pants pocket that Trooper Witte
identified as a "pipe," Trooper Witte had no need to continue to search Mr. Bertoch "for the
pipe ...in [the] right pants pocket."13 The Court can, and should, infer that Trooper Witte was
trying to bootstrap from a simple Terry frisk to search for a "weapon" when the Trooper
himself identified a pipe - clearly not a weapon - and informed Mr. Bertoch what was in his
pocket Bootstrapping to justify searching for something as small as a baggie in a separate
pocket located on Mr. Bertoch's right side is simply prohibited. The attempt to bootstrap
beyond the scope of a Terry frisk.
But Officer Witte even goes further- besides telling Mr. Bertoch what is in Mr.
Bertoch's pockets, Officer Witte has stated, in writing, that his search from the hard item in
has been "removed" by the Trooper from the person's car and who is under the control of the Trooper. Trooper
Witte has offered no report or testimony of conditions that would indicate that Mr. Bertoch was in any position to
cause a "rear-ending" to the detriment of Trooper Witte's safety at the Stop. The removal and frisk may have
exposed Mr. Bertoch to the same potential exposure to being hit by an on-coming vehicle.
12

Since no personal property report has been produced in discovery, we do not now know whether Trooper
Witte found lighters allegedly described by Mr. Bertoch or whether the remark (which must be suppressed if in
fact made) was verified by the Trooper's search and subsequent removal of the baggy from Mr. Bertoch's right
pocket. The report may be potentially exculpatory.
13

Trooper Witte could only continue the pat down to search for weapons, as more fully discussed infra.
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the left pocket "REVEALED A GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS POCKET,
AND A SMALL BAGGY OF A GREEN LEAFY SUBSTANCE IN THE RIGHT FRONT PANTS POCKET."

A Terry frisk, through the clothing of a person under the control of a law enforcement
officer, could not "reveal" that a pipe inside the pocket contains residue. A Terry frisk
conducted through clothing could not reveal whether a pipe was made from glass or some
other hard substance - ceramic or porcelain, for example.
At the Preliminary Hearing, Trooper Witte admitted he could not have determined
whether the pipe contained or had any residue while the pipe was in the pocket, although he
could determine that the item was not a weapon. Because Trooper Witte said (in reports
prepared within two or three hours of the actual frisk at the Stop) that the Terry frisk
"REVEALED A GLASS PIPE WITH BURNED RESIDUE IN HIS LEFT FRONT PANTS

POCKET,"{Emphasis

added } The Trooper's statement should be viewed as an admission that he eventually
removed the non-weapon to determine that it was made from glass rather than from some
other hard material, that he removed it so he could see that it contained residue - when the
only legitimate purpose of the frisk was to seek weapons to preserve personal safety.
And, when the Trooper told the "suspect" that what he felt in the left pocket was a pipe,
Trooper Witte admitted in his testimony that the pipe could have been a pipe for tobacco which is not "paraphernalia" and which is perfectly legal to carry.
Officer Witte could not claim that he had a "plain view" of the pipe through Mr.
Bertoch's pocket and could not determine whether the "pipe" was a tobacco pipe or a
marijuana pipe through the pocket, glass or ceramic, used or unused - and thus could not,
without removing the pipe, reach any conclusions about the purpose or past use of the pipe.
Officer Witte did not think the pipe and the baggy were weapons because he told Mr. Bertoch
to keep the items in his pocket for some period of time after having felt around Mr. Bertoch's
two pockets while patting down for "officer's safety" then moving his search from the left
pocket where he felt the pipe and then moving the search to the right pocket to continue the
search for something that had already been found. Trooper Witte could not assure himself
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that the pipe was contraband or that it had evidence of having been used with a product
deemed illegal or deemed to be a controlled substance.
Trooper Witte cannot convert the weapons pat down to an opportunity to get a "plain
view" of the contents of Mr. Bertoch's pocket. Even if Officer Witte could have seen the pipe
and the baggy by peering into a pocket that had a hole in it or looking into a pocket that was
gapping open at the top, Trooper Witte could not improve his view. The "plain view" doctrine
discussed in Arizona is inapposite to this facts asserted by Trooper Witte. The contents of Mr.
Bertoch's pockets were not in plain view. Touching a tube that is a pipe not obviously
contraband (as Trooper Witte admitted) does not justify seizure. "If the protective search
goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid
under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed," Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373,
citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968).
The minute Trooper Witte identified the tube in the left pocket as a "pipe," that could
have been used for tobacco and that Trooper Witte could not determine whether it had been
used or not without removing the item - and advised Mr. Bertoch to leave the item in his
pocket because Trooper Witte knew the item was not a weapon, any claim or argument to
justify removal and seizure of the "pipe" was extinguished and the search exceeded the
weapons search permitted under the Terry frisk - the very case Trooper Witte used in his
reports to describe what he was doing at the Stop.
Identifying the pipe in the left pocket does not justify removal of the baggy from the
right pocket because a baggy carrying green leafy substances is not a weapon, as Trooper
Witte clearly admits by telling Mr. Bertoch to leave it in his pocket until some point after
Trooper Witte allegedly found it - and he would not have been justified in looking at it once
he knew the right pocket did not contain a weapon. Trooper Witte was not justified in
extending the search under Terry and could not rely upon his questions to Mr. Bertoch asked
before Mr. Bertoch had been provided with Miranda warnings.
In one case reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, a police officer observed a
piece of stereo equipment in his plain view. The officer turned the equipment around so he
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could read serial numbers on the back - serial numbers that indicated the equipment was
stolen property. The seizure of the equipment was suppressed because the officer could not,
even having had a proper initial "plain view" enhance his plain view by turning the item
around. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
THE ZIG ZAG ROLLING PAPERS
AND THEIR SEIZURE SHOULD
ALSO BE SUPPRESSED
The Zig Zag rolling papers, listed as physical evidence, should be suppressed both on
the record produced by the Plaintiff and Trooper Witte and on the legality of owning and
transporting "rolling papers." Although it is possible (but no one has offered any evidence)
that the Zig Zags were in "plain view" once Trooper Hopkins began to search Mr. Bertoch's
car, the search at the Stop was not part of an inventory after an impoundment and clearly
was not part of a search for weapons to protect the officers' safety. Trooper Hopkins did not
search the car until after Trooper Witte had "removed" Mr. Bertoch from the car and had been
out of the car for at least ten minutes. Mr. Bertoch had no passengers in the car. He was
outside the car, had no weapons and was under Trooper Witte's control as an arrested
person at 2019. Trooper Witte described him as "slow" and unable to pass the sobriety tests
- in fact, Trooper Witte testified that he "failed miserably" at the Preliminary Hearing.
Trooper Hopkins found miscellaneous papers, 60 CDs, cigarettes and the Zig Zags in
the car and listed those items in documenting the impoundment of the car by Cartow. That
document suggests the Zig Zags were left in the car. Since the Zig Zag papers are not illegal
and do not constitute contraband in and of themselves and since they are small, not weapons
and not harmful, they should not be construed as evidence against Mr. Bertoch.
Even if the Zig Zags were removed from the car, they prove nothing as "evidence."
Because Trooper Hopkins found cigarettes during his search of the car, one could infer that
Mr. Bertoch uses tobacco - and tobacco users can and do use "rolling papers" if they want to
roll their own cigarettes, even though Trooper Hopkins did not find any loose tobacco in the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.
Case No. 001-919305: Travis Bertoch
Memorandum
Supporting
Motion to Suppress, etc., Page 14 of 28

car. 14 Possessing Zig Zags means nothing when the possessor smokes.15 And, strangely
enough, Trooper Witte claims to have taken possession of the Zig Zags at 2019, ten minutes
before Trooper Hopkins found them in his search at 2029. The purpose and the chain of
custody of the Zig Zags are so inherently lacking in probity and credibility that they should be
suppressed on the facts produced in discovery.
THE TERRY SEARCH WAS
IMPROPERLY EXPANDED;
ITS FRUITS MUST BE SUPPRESSED.
As stated, Trooper Witte admits he himself identified a "pipe," not a weapon, in Mr.
Bertoch's left pocket then searched further for the "pipe" by going to the right pocket where
he extracted the baggie -not a weapon. Trooper Witte even told Mr. Bertoch to keep the pipe
and the baggie in his pocket while Trooper Witte concerned himself with sobriety tests.
Trooper Witte's written statements, prepared immediately after the arrest and transport
of Mr. Bertoch to the Salt Lake County Jail, raise the question whether an officer who
conducts a Terry frisk and feels a "lump" in a person's pocket can constitutionally seize the
lump as "contraband" under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The United States Supreme
Court says no. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)(White, J.). In Dickerson, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Supreme Court, which suppressed the "lump"
Even though the Troopers did not find loose tobacco in the car or on Mr. Bertoch's person, no one can
conclude that the Zig Zags were used to smoke illegal products. Mr. Bertoch can carry papers in his car so he
has them available when he chooses to use loose tobacco or loose legal herbal compounds. He might have run
out of loose tobacco - since the marijuana must be suppressed, as argued above, the Zig Zags are useless as
evidence of a crime. Trooper Witte's report that Mr. Bertoch said he had marijuana and lighters in his right
pocket, which must be suppressed under Miranda, does not explain what happened during the search - Trooper
Witte does not at any point claim to have found lighters - no produced property inventory indicates that lighters
were present. One can ask whether Mr. Bertoch actually made the alleged statement - which must, of course
be suppressed under the "facts" alleged by Trooper Witte.
15

The Court is requested to notice that legal, herbal substitutes for tobacco that do not contain marijuana in any
form or under any other name, are available to those who want to smoke legally but do not want to use tobacco.
For example, Jeanie's Smoke Shop, 156 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 carries an herbal cigarette
(with no tobacco) and an herbal non-tobacco product that substitutes for chewing tobacco and believes other
companies have a broader range of non-tobacco products. Both the pipe and the Zig Zags can be used for
such products as well as for tobacco.
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removed from Dickerson's pocket. Officers had stopped Dickerson and frisked him for
weapons under Terry. Dickerson did not complain against the frisk for weapons. He moved
to suppress the "lump" seized from his pocket (which proved to be cocaine), and the
Minnesota Supreme Court suppressed. The United States Supreme Court rejected much of
the Minnesota court's reasoning, but affirmed and adopted its own standards, examining an
attempted analogy to the "plain view" doctrine, and also stating:
Under [the plain view doctrine from Michigan v. Long, citation omitted], if police are
lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is
immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object,
they may seize it without a warrant. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,136-137
(1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) {plurality opinion). If, however, the
police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband without
conducting some further search of the object - i.e., if "its incriminating character [is
not] Immediately apparent,' Horton, supra, at 136 - the plain view doctrine cannot
justify its seizure. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
***

The very premise of Terry, after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence
of weapons through the sense of touch, and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure.
Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the sense of
sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify seizures of
unseen contraband. . . . Where, as here, "an officer who is executing a valid search
of one item seizes a different item," this Court rightly "has been sensitive to the danger
. . . that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a warrant or
exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and seize at will."
[Citation omitted.] Here, the officer's continued exploration of respondent's
[Dickerson's] pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated
to "[t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry:]... the protection of the police
officer and others nearby." [Citation omitted] It therefore amounted to the sort of
evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize . . . and that we have
condemned in subsequent cases.
Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. at 373, 377, 378. A typescript Internet copy of Dickerson is
attached for the convenience of the Court as Ex. L.
Applying Dickerson to this case, then, Trooper Witte could conduct a Terry frisk to
determine whether Mr. Bertoch was carrying a weapon but could not seize an item that was
not a weapon (and that could have been a lawful tobacco pipe), then continue to search for
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the pipe located in the left pocket by searching the right pocket and seizing a "small baggie" which was clearly not a weapon and constituted no threat to Trooper Witte's safety or the
safety of anyone else.
Thus, under the facts described by Trooper Witte - with Trooper Witte moving his
search from left to right because he found something he told Mr. Bertoch was a "pipe," then
removing a small baggie containing a "green leafy substance" - the paraphernalia and the
baggie that reportedly contained marijuana, must be suppressed under Dickerson. With the
suppression of the pipe and the baggie, Counts II and III must be dismissed - but for the
ambiguous finding of the Zig Zags -which should also be suppressed, as argued above.

POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS

ALLEGEDLY MADE MUST BE
SUPPRESSED ON THE FACTS
ASSERTED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT.
Mr. Bertoch, Slow and Confused, Made No Knowing Waiver of Miranda Rights.
Trooper Witte followed Mr. Bertoch to observe his driving pattern but had nothing to criticize
in his written reports except the improper display of the license plate and, in his later
testimony, the absence of the trunk lid. Trooper Witte said Mr. Bertoch could not perform
field sobriety tests. Trooper Witte elicited statements from Mr. Bertoch (which, as argued
above, must be suppressed), which Mr. Bertoch gave with forthcoming candor but without
appreciation of the potential adverse effects of his cooperation.
Mr. Bertoch was revealed as a user of tobacco and (as must be suppressed) some
marijuana. Trooper Witte describes him as having "slow" speech and only "fair" balance.
Trooper Witte remembers Mr. Bertoch said he had broken ankles "a couple" of times but did
not note that Mr. Bertoch was suffering from a crushed toe. Trooper Witte reported that Mr.
Bertoch (who must wear corrective lenses when driving) had bloodshot eyes, a green tongue
and blisters on the back of his tongue. Officer Witte's report of the sobriety tests indicates
that both Mr. Bertoch's eyes lacked "smooth pursuit" and that he had distinct nystagmus,
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apparently meaning that his eyes had involuntary, rapid movements.16 Trooper Witte states
that Mr. Bertoch swayed and needed his arms for balance (at distances greater than 6 inches
from his side), improperly pivoted on both feet and twice suffered from imbalance. While the
lab results show that Trooper Witte erroneously attributed these "clues" as indicating
excessive alcohol or to marijuana allegedly smoked about 26 hours before the Stop. The
chemical tests disproved the presence of both alcohol and marijuana/metabolites.
Although Trooper Witte apparently did not have an immediate report on the blood test
during on September 19, he could have looked at what he did in fact have before him,
especially when wrote that Mr. Bertoch stated he had confusion when he allegedly heard a
question about being arrested for alcohol or drugs.
Trooper Witte was controlling a man who had a driver license record with no
allegations of driving under influence, was slow of speech, confused by an arrest statement,
uncertain of his physical balance, uncertain how to respond to the directions for the steps in a
sobriety test requiring careful attention to instructions, forthcoming and cooperative, patient
with and non-resistant to arrest and to the inherent indignity of standing at a gas station at an
extremely busy intersection while a technician took blood from his arm, very likely worried
about being arrested and about the impoundment of his car and undoubtedly tired after
working at a scaffolding company, cleaning a room at his house and putting the dishes away,
being stopped after having been followed by a UHP Trooper for approximately 16 to 19
minutes then being searched, tested for sobriety, being booked into Jail, undergoing an
additional search and then being told he had legal rights. This man, found slow of speech
and confused about chemical testing, allegedly agreed to continue talking to law enforcement
officers after he heard a warning 107 minutes after Trooper Witte stopped him and more than
two hours after the Trooper started following him. And, according to Trooper Witte had
blisters on the back of his tongue - which suggest a painful mouth - and, according to his
brother, a painful crushed toe that adversely affected his walking.
16

Those eye problems may explain part of Mr. Bertoch's need to wear corrective lenses. Since the Court was
able to see Mr. Bertoch at the Preliminary Hearing, the Court should notice that Mr. Bertoch was wearing
glasses (not contact lenses) with some thickness.
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Mr. Bertoch was not, at that time, a person fully capable to enforce his Miranda rights
- any statements attributed to him should be suppressed. At minimum, Miranda rights
cannot and should not be easily forgotten when a person faces the stress of arrest and
processing.17

THE USE OF THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED
"METH"
VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS,
The circumstances arising from and surrounding the seizure of the alleged "meth"
require that the seizure be suppressed in order to assure Mr. Bertoch of constitution
standards of due process and equal protection of the law. The Court is respectfully referred
to the timeline (with number fact paragraphs) to demonstrate the that must be reached here.
After taking Mr. Bertoch to the jail - presumably not because he had failed to display
his license plate in an approved manner- but because Trooper Witte suspected him of being
under the influence of alcohol or marijuana or its metabolite (a "suspicion" subsequently
disproved by chemical analysis), a jail deputy searched Mr. Bertoch and allegedly found,
according to Trooper Witte, a "white" plastic battery case at 2245 on the night of the Stop.
On two reports prepared by Trooper Witte, Trooper Witte describes the battery case as
"white" and containing a white powdery substance.
Trooper Witte placed the "white" plastic battery case into his own pocket.
Trooper Witte carried the "white" plastic battery case around in his own pocket until he
went to an evidence locker approximately two miles away from the jail where Mr. Bertoch was
being held at 0025, 10 minutes - one hour and forty minutes - after the jailer allegedly
conducted the search. Trooper Witte describes the batter case in the Incident Report dated

17

Mr. Bertoch does not here claim that any of the law enforcement officers treated him with "unnecessary rigor"
under Utah Constitution Article I Section 9 or that they acted cruelly or unusually under the Eight Amendment of
the United States Constitution. He does request the Court to infer and to conclude that the circumstances
primarily described by an educated and very well-prepared witness, as Trooper Witte confidently portrayed
himself at the Preliminary Hearing, demonstrate the stress, discomfort and overwhelming context and nature of
Mr. Bertoch's experience and the ease with which a forthcoming laborer can become enmeshed into an
accusatory and even intimidating atmosphere of criminal allegation, incarceration and personal/physical loss.
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9/20/01 at 12:25 a.m. (0025 in military time). Trooper Witte described the battery case as
"white" in the "No Warrant Arrest Fact Sheet" printed on 09/19/01 at 23:12.
But, the Evidence and Property Report, {Ex. H}, which describes the chain of custody
of the batter case from the jail deputy at 2245 on 09/19/01 to Trooper Witte at 2245 on
09/19/01 (when Trooper Witte placed the white batter case in his pocket), the battery case
placed into Locker Number 558 by Trooper Witte at 0025 on 09/20/01 and then leaves the
Locker for the Crime Lab at 1000 on 09/20/01 is not white but is "clear" The Clerk named as
the Section 16 Evidence Custodian and as the Clerk Receiving Property initialed the form
describing a "small clear, plastic battery case containing a white powdery substance."
{Emphasis added}
By the time the probable cause statement is attached to the Information for review by
a Deputy District Attorney on December 13, 2001, the battery case has become "a plastic
container with a white powdery substance."
The witness and evidence list describe the alleged "evidence" as "white crystal
powder" without reference to its container.
How did the "white" battery case described by Trooper Witte as having been found by
the jail deputy and handed by the jail deputy to Trooper Witte at 2245 and described by
Trooper Witte as being "white" in a report printed at 2325 and in a report completed at 0025
after being carried in Trooper Witte's pocket for 100 minutes turn into a "clear" container
when placed into the locker and when removed from the locker? Trooper Witte went
approximately two miles from the jail where he took Mr. Bertoch to the Section 16 office at
some point after 2245. He does not describe having a partner with him.
Perhaps because the discrepancy from a white battery case to a clear battery case
was noticed, the unsigned probable cause statement submitted to the Deputy District
Attorney as part of the Information refers only to a "plastic container." The evidence allegedly
supporting the first count (felony possession of methamphetamine) then become a "white
crystal powder" without reference to any kind of container- but the "evidence" allegedly

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 001-919305: Travis Bertoch
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Suppress, etc.. Paqe 20 of 28

supporting the charge of marijuana possession is the systematically and consistently
described container and contents "small baggy with green leafy substance."
No one can possibly determine beyond reasonable doubt just what color of container
was allegedly found by the jail deputy and put into the pocket of Trooper Witte - where it
allegedly remained for 100 minutes - before it became a "clear" battery case before
becoming a "plastic container" for purposes of the probable cause statement on the
Information. Somewhere between the alleged discovery of the "white" battery case and the
delivery of the "clear" battery case to the evidence clerk, the battery case becomes different.
It is enough "different" to become an undescribed "plastic" container about 84 days later,
December 13, 2001.
The only real "evidence" of felony possession of methamphetamine is thus tainted,
unreliable - and the alleged chain of custody is flawed and impeached by the records of the
Utah Highway Patrol. We do not know why Trooper Witte describes a "white" plastic battery
case having been given to him at 2245 by the jail deputy, still described as "white" plastic in
the report printed at 2312 and in the report completed at 0025 - yet placed in a locker as
"clear" plastic at the same time and transferred to the crime lab at 1000 as "clear" - and backstated on the chain of custody as having been "clear" when first found and given to Trooper
Witte. All we know is that the official UHP documents describe two colors for the batter/
case: white and clear and that the subsequent probable cause affidavit drops the description
from either white or clear and refers only to a "plastic" container and the evidence list refers to
"white crystal powder." We have no way to determine where any white crystal powder came
from - at least without finding a gross inconsistency in the chain of custody and without
looking for the unexplained change that occurs in the records during the 100 minutes in
Trooper Witte's pocket - or at least in the 9 hours and 35 minutes between the deposit into
the Locker to the delivery to the crime lab.
No one can be asked to defend against such indefinite "evidence" and such
inconsistent assertions. No one can legitimately be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt by
alleged "evidence" with such a checkered and inconsistent history. The so-called "evidence,"
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now consisting only of a white crystal powder, must be suppressed; it is now inherently and
unquestionably lacking in probity and in legitimacy. The facts produced by the prosecution
through the law enforcement officers are exculpatory; the facts require suppression/

THE EXPANSION OF THE STOP
FROM A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
TO AN ARREST FOR AN ALLEGED FELONY
AROSE FROM PROFILING,
NOT FROM ANY LEGITIMATE CONCERNS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Constitution
requires that the States accord equal protection of the law to all persons. The Utah
Constitution requires uniform operation of law. Utah's Constitution affirms that Utah is
inseparable from the Union of the States, that is the United States, and thus its total
adherence to the Constitution of the United States. The Utah Constitution guarantees the free
exercise political thought and free expression and uniform operation of law. {See United
States Constitution, Amendment 14; Utah Constitution, Article I, Sections 1,2 3, 24.} These
noble and, in many cases, self-executing principles of constitutional government, form the
backdrop against which the Stop of Mr. Bertoch, a man with a shaved head and tattoos on
his arms, must be examined.
The current and lively national debate over profiling by law enforcement officials in
performing their actions, primarily in a racial context, began shortly after the horrendous and
devastating attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, only 8 days before the
arrest of Mr. Bertoch. Because the attacks have been attributed to a group of radical
terrorists of one religious and ethnic background, a number of ugly, vengeful and allegedly
retaliatory acts were committed in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, including an arson at
a restaurant near 2100 South State in Salt Lake City and the denial of transport to two
persons with airline tickets from Minnesota to Salt Lake City.
The President has gravely counseled agafnst retaliatory behavior and blanket prejudgments on any basis, as have numerous other national and local leaders in varying walks
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of life. Enhanced airport safety measures and calls for greater citizen vigilance and diligent
reporting of suspicious activities and conduct has been counseled, but those are not to be
based upon personal appearance, ethnicity, religious practice, political statements or any
other prejudice.
The concerns about terrorism and retaliation, quite logically, have given rise to a
lengthy debate over and allegations that law enforcement at all levels engages in profiling racial or ethnic profiling garnering the greatest amount of attention - with religious and even
political discrimination inherent in the debate and the search for preservation of rights and
freedom while defending against terrorism and even other misconduct.
From the totality of the circumstances set forth by law enforcement in the reports and
statements in this case and from the supplemental information that Mr. Bertoch has tattoos
on both of his arms and shaves his head and from Mr. Bertoch's appearance at the
Preliminary Hearing and other court appearances, this Court can see and can conclude that
Mr. Bertoch looks like a "skinhead." Like a number of other ethnic, religious or political
groups that can be identified visually, being a "skinhead" carries a prejudged and thus a
prejudicial burden upon those who look like skinheads. The reputation of skinheads, as a
group, is based on rumor, assertion and sometimes upon a few facts about specific
circumstances, specific issues and specific persons who identify themselves as "skinheads."
These generalizations expand - like any other stereotype - to impugn all those who look like
members of the "skinheads" category or classification.
Evidence of a prejudicial attitude toward "skinheads" can be inferred from the law
enforcement statements and testimony in this case. Although Trooper Witte specifically
claims in his written reports that he observed an improperly displayed license plate and never
himself mentioned the absence of the trunk lid on Mr. Bertoch's car, at the Preliminary
Hearing Trooper Witte testified forcefully that the absence of the trunk lid, while admitting that
is not in itself illegal, constitutes "suspicion." He followed the car at slow speed for some two
miles, about 16 minutes before making the Stop, although the improper display of the plate
was easily noticed. Trooper Witte also states that he decided against running the license
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plate (which he saw on the shelf behind the back seat of the car) until some time after he
instituted the Stop. Rather than checking the plate, Trooper Witte removed Mr. Bertoch from
his car and frisked him for weapons - although the worst thing Officer Witte observed while
he followed Mr. Bertoch for approximately 16 minutes from Redwood Road and SR 201
(approximately 2100 South) to 1-15 and then onto I-80 near State Street was the improper
display of a license plate and the absence of a trunk lid.
Just what "suspicion" does the absence of a trunk lid raise?
If the driver had been a 50-year old woman with gray hair, the "suspicion" would be
that her trunk lid had been damaged or its springs/closing devices had been broken and she
was awaiting repair and replacement of the lid.
If the driver had been a clean-cut college student with a tan, the "suspicion" could
easily have been that the student had been hauling his lawn mower and tools around to
provide landscape services as his summer job - or that he was getting ready to haul a snow
blower around in hopes of going from landscaping to snow removal as the fall season went
from warm weather to winter.
If the driver worked with a scaffolding company crew, as does Mr. Bertoch, the
"suspicion" should have been that he hauled equipment to and from job sites - or that he also
did landscaping work or anticipated performing snow removal or had suffered damage to his
trunk lid or its springs and was awaiting repair - or any number of other legitimate and logical
reasons why someone would drive his car while the trunk lid was missing.
And the fact that Trooper Witte could see that a license plate was lying flat in front of
the rear window could even have raised another "suspicion:" that the driver had leaned the
license plate against the window so it would be visible, but as the driver went along, he had
hit bumps or turned corners, causing the license plate to fall into a flat position.
But not Trooper Witte, who could see the license plate lying flat and must just as easily
have seen a "skinhead" and possibly even the tattoos as he followed his lidless suspect at a
slow speed for some 16 minutes. The "receiving of stolen property" line on an official report
seems in fact reveal part of Trooper Witte's thinking and his profile: an absent trunk lid and a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Case No. 001-919305: Travis Bertoch Memorandum Supporting Motion to Suppress, etc.. Paae 24 of 28

"skinhead" with tattoos on his arms: "skinheads" receive stolen property or participate in other
illegal activities - they even carry arms or contraband. Why a "skinhead" would lay the
license plate on the back of the seat where Officer Witte could see it doesn't fit - so leave it
aside. Mr. Bertoch was profiled - here is a skinhead without a trunk lid, therefore he must be
involved in illegal activity. Mr. Bertoch waited a long while before Trooper Witte or someone
else ran the license plate - only to discover that the plate indicated a valid and unexpired
registration to Mr. Bertoch and the driver's license was restricted only by the requirement that
Mr. Bertoch wear corrective lenses when he drives.
It is true that Trooper Witte alleges that he smelled the odor of alcohol coming from Mr.
Bertoch - that is Trooper Witte's initial statement. He then, prior to giving any Miranda
warnings, questions Mr. Bertoch who responds (and whose responses should be
suppressed, as previously set forth) that he drank two beers about 90 to 120 minutes earlier
- and that he used marijuana the previous night. These remarks come from a truthful and
cooperative man - one who did not fully realize the consequences of his truthful statements.
Once Trooper Witte filled out the pre-prepared form for UHP DUI reports, the prejudice
and pre-judgment of the UHP was revealed: Trooper Witte started with the odor of alcohol
allegedly coming from Mr. Bertoch, but the UHP DUI Report pre-judges and pre-reports the
allegation as not just the alleged odor of alcohol, but the "odor of an alcoholic beverage."
Officer Witte adopts the "alcoholic beverage" description in his own writings, not just in
filling out the mandatory, expected pre-prepared form, and places the alleged and newly
described odor of a beverage on Mr. Bertoch's breath.
But the alleged odor of alcohol coming from Mr. Bertoch or the later-alleged odor of an
alcoholic beverage on Mr. Bertoch's breath need not have delayed Trooper Witte from
"running" the license plate - especially since the records would have informed Officer Witte
whether Mr. Bertoch had prior DUI arrests or had a stolen vehicle - which he did not. The
information from checking the plate and the license is at least partially exculpatory - the
common process of "running" license plates provides context, background and even some
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amount of exculpation - but Trooper Witte preferred to turn elsewhere first because he had a
"skinhead" and one with tattoos on his arms.
Trooper Witte observed green coloring and blisters on Mr. Bertoch's tongue - in the
absence of medical information, Trooper Witte should only have speculated that the green
coloring came from drinking green Kool Aid or sucking on green Skittles candy - or even from
those vivid bubble gum balls that temporarily stain kids' mouths ghastly green, blasphemous
blue or perilous pink.
The blisters on the tongue could indicate canker sores from allergies or small boils which might be helped by a mouthwash containing alcohol. Even with the volunteered
information about two beers earlier in the evening, Trooper Witte could not truly conclude that
the alleged odor of alcohol would emanate from Mr. Bertoch for almost two hours after he
drank beer (information, again, that must be suppressed).
This is a case that arises from profiling. The officer saw a tattooed skinhead and
convinced himself that the man had to be guilty of something beside an improper plate. He
allegedly smelled alcohol, at first just coming from Mr. Bertoch but consistent with the UHP's
pre-prepared form, transformed into the odor of an "alcoholic beverage" coming from Mr.
B<ertoch's breath. The truthful statement (that must be suppressed) that Mr. Bertoch drank
some beer about 2 hours earlier was not enough to indicate driving under the influence - nor
was the statement (that must be suppressed) that Mr. Bertoch had smoked marijuana about
26 hours before the stop.
Had Mr. Bertoch been something other than a man with a skinhead and tattoos on his
arms, Trooper Witte would have undoubtedly exercised his experience - and even his
caution - w i t h greater wisdom, checking the ownership of the vehicle and the driving record
(with no prior dui arrests or convictions) and could have come to a better conclusion. Blood
shot eyes, like canker sores, arise from allergies - and September 2001 was far from free of
allergy-producing plants (which the Court may notice). Lack of balance from a man with two
past broken ankles and a painful, crushed toe is not surprising. Nystagmus and blood shot
eyes partly explain Mr. Bertoch's need for glasses - which were in his car. Because Mr.
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Bertoch looks like a skinhead with tattoos, he is not granted the benefit of alternative
reasoning by Trooper Witte. Profiling was present, active and basic to this case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments and upon the documents as produced in
discovery, the statements by Mr. Bertoch and the items seized from him must be suppressed.
Even more, all of the charges - with the exception of the improper display of the license plate
not here challenged - must be dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Bertoch should be granted such
other and further relief as may be just and proper.
Dated: April 19, 2002.
Respectfullysubmitted,
4c^
%

M. Karlynn Hinnjan
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ARGUMENT
The Terry Frisk: The Pipe, Plastic Bag of "Green Leafy" Substance and Papers
Should be Suppressed. Plaintiff has not challenged the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court setting forth the scope of an initial Terry frisk. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). The first part of Plaintiffs answering brief admits the search that located the pipe
was part of a frisk. The arresting Trooper admits the pipe he allegedly felt in Mr. Bertoch's
trousers pocket could have been used for tobacco as well as for marijuana, although he
over-anxiously testified that he had felt a pipe with marijuana residue in Mr. Bertoch's
pocket. Transcript of Preliminary Hearing ("Tr.") page 22 line 25 - page 23 line 3.1
Since the Trooper was so certain what he had found (the pipe) during the frisk, he
knew he was in no danger from the item he felt - and he felt nothing else in the pockets or
on the person of Mr. Bertoch to cause him any concern about weapons or other things that
could be harmful to him.2 The Trooper's search exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk and
the items seized at the scene of the stop should be suppressed, as argued more
extensively in the initial brief.
Plaintiff cannot protect the seizures made in violation of Terry by arguing the items
would have been located later anyway - Mr. Bertoch was entitled to the constitutional and
legal protections carefully stated in Terry and its progeny, including Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), when the frisk began - a constitutional right cannot be so
easily denied as the Plaintiff would have this Court rule.
Mr. Bertoch's Statements at the Stop Should Be Suppressed. Plaintiff, after ignoring
entirely the legal scope and legal constraints on a Terry frisk, argues that the seizure of the
pipe felt through Mr. Bertoch's pocket and the small plastic bag fished out of another
1

The Transcript was to be attached as Exhibit M to the opening brief. The certified transcript, completed by
a court reporting service on Friday, June 7, 2002, is being filed with the Court. A copy of the "four-page per
page" version is attached to this Brief for the convenience of the Court.
During the Preliminary Hearing, the Trooper testified only briefly about the topic of officer's safety, the
rubric that allegedly justifies extensive searches and other police conduct in pre-arrest and arrest situations.
Here the Trooper said, in substance, he wanted to make the stop at a safe location because he had been
rear-ended twice. The driver of a stopped car cannot cause rear-ending when the driver has been removed
from the car. See Tr. page 13 lines 9 - 1 5 .
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pocket are part of a lawful seizure in connection with an arrest for paraphernalia. Having
made this argument as a post-Terry justification for seizure of alleged paraphernalia,
Plaintiff is now governed by the requirements of Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). If Mr. Bertoch was under arrest and the Trooper questioned him, then the
statements allegedly made by Mr. Bertoch must be suppressed because, according to the
records prepared by or under the direction of the Trooper, Mr. Bertoch was not given
Miranda warnings until well after the initial stop - after he had been Ter/y-frisked,
questioned, in-fact searched, given field sobriety tests, transported to the street near a gas
station for a blood test and finally taken to a jail facility where the Trooper's records report
the reading of Miranda.
Plaintiffs arguments are internally inconsistent and create a dilemma: either the
search was a Terry frisk prior to arrest so items obviously not weapons could not be
removed then used as evidence of criminal activity (here, possession of paraphernalia and
possession of marijuana) and must be suppressed or Mr. Bertoch was immediately under
arrest and thus was entitled to Miranda warnings and anything he might have said should
be suppressed.
The resolution of the dilemma created by the Plaintiffs arguments is simple: a
Defendant cannot be convicted if the prosecution picks and chooses what legal restraints
apply at what times - the Plaintiffs case must fail because of suppression; the Defendant
is entitled to legal and constitutional protection.
Plaintiffs Citation of Authority Misinterprets the Law and Pertinent Facts. In citing a
case from the Utah Supreme Court, Plaintiff argues at one point that Miranda did not apply
to a routine traffic stop. A routine traffic stop is one that results in a warning ticket or a
citation for some kind of traffic violation - whether it be driving with an improperly displayed
license plate or speeding. When the routine traffic stop becomes something else,
constitutional standards, including Miranda apply. Although the Plaintiff argues that Mr.
Bertoch's statements before he received Miranda warnings should not be suppressed
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because his statements occurred during a traffic stop, the argument is belied by at least
three crucial factors.
First, the traffic stop was not routine because the Trooper demonstrated no intention
whatsoever to issue a mere citation for improper display of a license plate - he could have
run the plate number for the plate that was resting near the back window if that had been
his interest, but he thought he might have a stolen vehicle, Tr. page 15 line 9, (because the
trunk was absent even though it was clear to him that a license plate was near the back
window of the trunkless car) but allegedly smelled alcohol (later an "alcoholic beverage")
coming from Mr. Bertoch's person (making the stop immediately something other than a
routine traffic stop).
Second, the Trooper testified that Mr. Bertoch was not free to go when the Trooper
was investigating the alleged alcohol. Tr. page 24 lines 6 - 1 0 .
Third, the Utah Supreme Court has examined, in the case cited by Plaintiff, when
Miranda applies. See Plaintiff's Answering Brief, page 3 Argument I, referring to Salt Lake
Cityv. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039, 1042 (Utah 1987) {citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420,440(1984)).
The United States Supreme Court, in the case cited by the Utah Supreme Court in
Womack, carefully distinguishes between a routine traffic stop when the motorist
reasonably expects he will be questioned about routine matters such as his identify, his
vehicle and its licensing. (A printout of Berkemer is attached for the Court's convenience.)
The motorist has no obligation to answer the questions, but the Miranda warnings are not
mandatory when the stop is brief, the motorist remains in his vehicle and the stop involves
some kind of traffic matter resolved by a traffic citation or ticket.
Here, the Trooper converted the routine stop by his actions and by his reports of
what he allegedly believed. He testified that the absence of a trunk and the license plate
resting flat near the rear window on a car was a "suspicion." Tr. pages 14 line 25 to
pagel 5 line 11. As a "suspicion," these factors justify only a Terry frisk - not the seizure
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of something the Trooper immediately knew was not a weapon. The Trooper could not
seize.
Once the Trooper allegedly smelled alcohol and allegedly saw reddened eyes,3 the
Trooper converted the routine stop to something much more important: he was detaining
Mr. Bertoch as a suspect for the crime of driving under influence of alcohol (as well as the
Trooper's pre-conceived notion that Mr. Bertoch was driving a stolen car because his car
lacked a trunk). At that point, Mr. Bertoch was entitled to Miranda warnings and was, in
fact, being detained. The Trooper could question but Plaintiff cannot expect any alleged
statements by Mr. Bertoch to be admitted. Any statements attributed to Mr. Bertoch must
be suppressed.
Nothing Can Overcome "Reasonable Doubt" about the Container of Alleged
Methamphetamine. Rather than explaining why a small container allegedly removed from
Mr. Bertoch's pocket during a search at the jail could begin as a "white" container but
would be described in documents accepted several hours later by an evidence clerk as a
"clear" container, Plaintiff says that Defendant and his counsel will be able to observe the
alleged "evidence" at trial. That is no answer.
No matter what container is produced at trial, it is impossible to determine what
alleged container was at the jail and what alleged container was received by a clerk for
testing or storage as alleged evidence. The problem exists because of the records
compiled by the prosecution, including those records and reports prepared and produced
for and on behalf of the arresting Trooper. This is not just a weakness in the chain of
custody; this is far more serious. The two descriptions of an alleged piece of evidence go
to the heart of the evidence: the evidence cannot be identified from the records prepared

3

Plaintiffs Answering Brief, page 4, paragraph 2, line 4 of the paragraph, claims Mr. Bertoch's speech was
"slurred." That assertion is not supported by the testimony of the Trooper and is not supported by any
statement in the discovery documents that have been produced. The Trooper wrote that Mr. Bertoch was
"slow," not that he was "slurred." The notion of "slurred" speech introduces a concept, connotation and fact
not in evidence and should be stricken.
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by and on behalf of the prosecution. And those records were made shortly after the arrest
of Mr. Bertoch by the officials involved in the arrest and procedures surrounding the arrest.
Even if the Trooper, the jail Deputy, the evidence Clerk and the typists who worked
on the reports are called to testify, their testimony in June 2002, approximately nine
months after the date of the arrest, will be long after the events of September 19, 2001, the
time of arrest. Moreover, it is doubtful that any one of the possible witnesses will have an
independent recollection of the circumstances surrounding the September 19, 2001 event.
Defendant requests the Court to take notice of these common facts: Clerks at the Section
16 facilities of the Utah Highway Patrol (see Exhibit H to Defendant's initial Memorandum)4
receive items to be held as evidence virtually every single day of their employment - and
likely received more items on some days than on others. They cannot be expected to
have an independent recollection of an item identified in a signed or initialed report
prepared several months ago.
Those persons engaged to assist in typing reports - assuming that they are not the
Troopers themselves - use pre-prepared forms and are undoubtedly engaged with a daily
work load commensurate with their ranks and status as members of the Utah Highway
Patrol. They cannot be expected to remember individual reports or the information given
to them in assisting with the preparation of a report.
Deputies assigned to the Salt Lake County jail facilities to assist with processing
new arrestees undoubtedly have seen more persons arrested for alleged drug violations
during the past nine months than just one or two. They cannot be expected to provide
testimony now that would specifically clarify what was allegedly seized or why the allegedly
seized container was described in different ways on the same night as the arrest.
The Trooper testified "Also, as a Highway Patrolman, I have made numerous
arrests for controlled substance, many of which are marijuana." Tr. page 9 lines 1 - 4 .
4

According to Exhibit H, Utah Highway Patrol Section 16 "Special Operations" Evidence and Property
Report, the "clear'1 container was placed in an evidence locker at 0025 (just after midnight on September 20,
2001) and received by the property clerk at 10:00 a.m. on September 20, 2001, almost ten hours later. At
the Preliminary Hearing, the Trooper described the container as "white." Tr. page 10 linel.
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The alleged container of methamphetamine is simply unreliable evidence - not
because of anything done or not done by Mr. Bertoch, but because of the written
statements made and prepared on the night of the incident are inconsistent, confused and
cannot provide a reasonable basis for the identification of alleged evidence central to the
charge brought against Mr. Bertoch.
Because of the unreliability of the sole and central evidence of the charge of alleged
possession of methamphetamine (the single felony charge in this matter), the alleged
evidence must be suppressed and the charge dismissed - the Court need not allow the
prosecution to take this charge beyond this motion.
The Profiling Issue. Mr. Bertoch, with shaved head and tattoos on his arms, could be a
member of the so-called "skinheads," a loose group of white males who allegedly hold
militant ideas or who behave in a militant or threatening manner to assert their own notions
and positions with respect to the rights and interests of others. The Utah Highway Patrol
forms describe Mr. Bertoch as having "blond" hair- but the only evidence introduced in
support of this motion that was not produced on behalf of the prosecution (by the Utah
Highway Patrol or by affidavits from offices or persons associated with the prosecution) is
the brief affidavit from Mr. Bertoch's brother stating that Mr. Bertoch has never had blond
hair and that his head was shaved on September 19, 2001 when he was arrested.
Once again, the discovery documents indicate the haste and carelessness of
authorities underlying the charges in this case. No one paid enough attention to get the
hair color correct - but anyone observing Mr. Bertoch could see that his head was shaved
and that, if his arms are uncovered (as they had to be when the blood sample was taken
street side at 2100 South and State Street), he has tattoos. These factors are part of the
stereotype for "skinheads," a prejudicial and often politically disparaging grouping or
category, a banality, even an insult. People who look like skinheads are notices for
precisely the characteristic that gives the group its name: skinheads.
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The Court is requested to notice that skinhead is a term of disparagement used to
evoke prejudice, suspicion and even accusation based upon an obvious physical
characteristic: a white male with a shaved head.
Was there profiling? While not admitted by any person or agency, profiling is
virtually automatic based upon experience and observation - and here, with "suspicion"
aroused because of the absence of a trunk on a car - the suspicion was magnified when
Mr. Bertoch was observed. A subjective factor? Yes, of course. An insult to law
enforcement? Not intended, but the protest is Shakespearean. Profiling is not the crux of
this motion; the violation of Mr. Bertoch's rights and the need to suppress alleged evidence
and statements is the central point. The motion must be granted with respect to all matters
raised.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the initial brief, the documents and discovery materials
provided by the prosecution, the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the dilemmas raised
by the prosecutions brief and for the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bertoch requests that his
motion be granted and that all charges be dismissed.
Dated: June 10,2002
Respectfully submitted,

( f \

M. Karlynn Hi
Hinmdn
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Frank D. ZEPEDA, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20020260-CA.
Sept. 5, 2003.
Sixth District, Kanab Department; The Honorable
David L. Mower.
Mary Deiss Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges JACKSON, ORME, and THORNE.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
* 1 Frank Zepeda challenges the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress, arguing (i) that the officer did
not have probable cause to stop Zepeda's vehicle, and
(ii) that the evidence and confession obtained during
the stop were obtained in violation of Zepeda's Fifth
Amendment Miranda rights. We affirm.
Zepeda first argues that, insofar as he was preparing
to make a right-hand turn, he was justified in
operating his vehicle outside of the normal lane of
travel. This contention is not supported by the Utah
Code, however, which clearly states that right-hand
turns are to "be made as close as practical to the
right-hand curb or edge of the roadway" Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6- 66(1) (1998) (emphasis added). Given
the clear statutory distinction between the "roadway"
and the "shoulder," compare Utah Code Ann. §41-61(41) (Supp.2002) (defining "roadway" as the
"portion of highway ... ordinarily used for vehicular
travel, exclusive of the ... shoulder ") (emphasis
added) with id. § 41-6-1(45) (defining "shoulder
area" as "that area of the hard- surfaced highway
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge
line"), it is clear that Zepeda was required by law to
stay within the proper confines of the roadway while

preparing to make his right-hand turn.
Zepeda also argues that his use of the breakdown
lane was justified by the fact that he was traveling at a
slow rate of speed. This contention is incorrect.
Under Utah law, "a vehicle proceeding at less than
the normal speed of traffic ... shall be operated in the
right-hand lane then available for traffic, or as close
as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the
roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53(2) (1998). By
its express terms, Utah law allows for travel only in
the "lane" or "roadway." Here, insofar as Zepeda was
admittedly traveling outside of the defined
"roadway," his use of the "breakdown lane" was not
justified by his rate of speed. Thus, insofar as the
officer personally observed Zepeda's illegal operation
of his vehicle, we hold that the traffic stop was
justified. [FN1]
FN1. Zepeda also argues that his failure to
operate his vehicle in a regular lane of
traffic was caused by "faint or non-existent"
markings at the side of the road. Zepeda
fails to cite any legal authority, however,
that would indicate that such a condition
invalidates the officer's probable cause to
effectuate a traffic stop. We accordingly
decline to address the argument. See Smith
v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
2003 UT 23,1 46, 70 P.3d 904 (citations
omitted).
Zepeda next argues that the trial court erred in not
suppressing Zepeda's admissions to the officer
regarding his marijuana use. Specifically, Zepeda
argues that the officer's conduct at the traffic stop
subjected him to a custodial interrogation, thereby
mandating Miranda warnings.
"It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by
Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated
with formal arrest.' " Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984) (citation
omitted). In Berkemer, the United States Supreme
Court specifically held that though "a traffic stop
significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' " of the
driver, id. at 436, 104 S.Ct. at 3148, the stop does not
become custodial for Miranda purposes unless the
circumstances of the stop "exert[ ] upon [the]
detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his
free exercise of his privilege against selfincrimination." Id at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149. Thus,
"[a] person may be 'seized' for Fourth Amendment
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purposes but not be 'in custody' for Fifth Amendment
purposes." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147
(Utah 1996).
*2 "To determine if a person is in custody... we look
to ' "(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the
length and form of interrogation." ' " State v.
Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
(quoting Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147). In accordance
with these factors, we hold that the circumstances
here were not such that Zepeda's privilege against
self-incrimination was impaired. First, the site in
which the questioning occurred was decidedly noncustodial, as the questioning occurred not in the
intimidating confines of a patrol car or at the police
station, but rather while Zepeda was in his own car.
Compare Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147; Brandley, 972
P.2d at 83. Second, at the time of the questioning, it is
apparent that the typical indicia of arrest, "such as
readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns," Salt
Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah
1983), were not present. Third, the length and form of
the interrogation were not such so as to resemble an
arrest. There is no indication that the officer's
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questioning regarding the smell of marijuana
emanating from Zepeda's car was accompanied by
any direct accusations of illegal drug usage or by
coercive orders that were calculated to induce Zepeda
to confess to wrongdoing. Compare Mirquet, 914
P.2d at 1147-48. Further, there is no indication that
the officer raised his voice in a threatening manner so
as to intimidate Zepeda into cooperating with his
questioning. Compare Brandley, 972 P.2d at 82.
Finally, neither the length of time involved in the
traffic stop nor the nature of the questioning
resembled that which is typically found in an arrest.
Compare id. (holding that a questioning which lasted
"only ten to fifteen minutes" was not unduly
coercive). Instead, we find that the officer's conduct
was entirely consistent with a non-custodial traffic
stop. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err
in ruling that Zepeda's confession and the evidence
obtained as a result of that confession were
admissible.
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges.
END OF DOCUMENT
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